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Research has identified that addiction related stimuli can cause attentional bias 
effects due to preferential treatment and allocation of cognitive resources. 
Furthermore, scalar expectancy theory (SET) and internal clock models (ICM) 
account for the role of arousal, attention, and memory in time keeping and time 
perception. This thesis investigated the effects of addiction related stimuli in time 
perception by attempting to discriminate between each of the three factors of 
arousal, attention, and memory. Initially this thesis replicated the Stroop interference 
caused by gambling stimuli and then expanded on into Facebook/Internet related 
stimuli (chapter 2). Findings from both of the above paradigms suggest that gambling 
related and Facebook/Internet related stimuli can cause attentional bias effects. In 
chapter 3 using a novel gambling modified temporal bisection task, this thesis 
investigated whether gambling related stimuli can cause temporal interference due to 
arousal or attentional mechanism, and whether negative or positive gambling related 
stimuli would further affect these effects. Findings indicated that Poker players 
underestimated durations for gambling related stimuli but not for neutral ones. No 
such findings were discovered for the control group. Furthermore, Poker players 
exhibited better temporal discriminability compared to the control group. In chapter 4, 
using a novel Facebook/Internet modified temporal bisection task, these findings 
were using Facebook/Internet related stimuli (salient) and neutral ones. Participants 
demonstrated underestimation of time for salient stimuli but not neutral ones. 
Furthermore, repetition and familiarity did not have an effect on time perception. 
Therefore, one could conclude that it is the emotional content of said salient stimuli 
that drove these effects and not familiarity. Finally, in chapter 5, this thesis 
investigated to what extent increasing memory load would affect the previously 
mentioned temporal perception distortions. Using a temporal bisection and N-back 
(or Sternberg) dual task, results suggested that salience effects on time perception 
disappear when memory load increases. Taken together, the above findings propose 
that addiction can provide greater insight and support to SET and ICM. On the other 
hand, time perception should also be used as a tool for detecting attentional and 
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 The aim of this doctoral work was to investigate the effects of non-substance 
addiction related stimuli (salient stimuli) on our perception of time, more specifically 
the effects of gambling and Facebook/Internet related stimuli. This investigation 
employed a number of experimental paradigms that will be outlined at the 
methodological section of this introductory chapter. Prior to that, I will outline relevant 
psychological theories that account for attentional bias effects due to addiction 
related salient stimuli. Furthermore, I will provide evidence from previous research 
that support such theories. I will then discuss the internal clock model (ICM) and the 
scalar expectancy theory (SET) and provide examples of previous research that 
documented factors that could affect our time perception. I will then conclude the 
theoretical part of this chapter by bringing together addiction theories and time 
perception literature and provide the rationale of why we should expect distortions in 
our time perception when exposed to gambling and Facebook/Internet related 
stimuli.   
 
Addiction Theories and Attentional Bias 
 Attentional Bias (AB) in addiction is generally characterised as the tendency 
of addicted individual for preferential allocation of attentional resources towards 
addiction related stimuli. This has been documented across a number of addiction 
types such as alcohol (e.g., Jones, Bruce, Livingstone, & Reed, 2006; Klein, 2007; 
Noël et al., 2006; Sharma, Albery, & Cook, 2001; Stormark, Laberg, Nordby, & 
Hugdahl, 2000; Townshend & Duka, 2003; Waters & Green, 2003), cannabis (e.g., 
Cane, Sharma, & Albery, 2009; Field, Mogg, & Bradley, 2004; Field, Eastwood, 
Bradley, & Mogg, 2006; Field, 2005), opioids (e.g., Bearre, Sturt, Bruce, & Jones, 
2007; Carpenter, Schreiber, Church, & McDowell, 2006; Copersino et al., 2004; 
Franken, Kroon, Weirs, & Jansen, 2000; Sharma & Money, 2010; Vadhan et al., 
2007), pathological gambling (e.g., Brevers et al., 2011; Ciccarelli, Nigro, Griffiths, 





Wölfling et al., 2011), and excessive internet use (Jeromin, Nyenhuis, & Barke, 
2016; Metcalf & Pammer, 2011a; Zhou, Yuan, & Yao, 2012a). It should be noted 
though for excessive internet use research on attentional bias has mainly focused on 
online gaming and computer gaming. No research has been carried out regarding 
attentional bias due to Facebook or general Internet use.  
 A number of psychological theories have attempted to provide support for the 
AB effects elicited from addiction related stimuli. Even though some theories might 
not explain AB directly, they can still account for it by generalising. A good example 
of such theory is the dual affect model as proposed by Baker, Morse, and Sherman 
(1986). According to this model, there are two systems in play, a positive-affect and 
a negative-affect system. Any stimuli associated with the positive-affect system could 
activate addiction related activities, where as any stimuli associated with the 
negative-affect system could activate an inhibitory behaviour. Even though the model 
makes these claims for substance related addiction one can easily see that they can 
be generalised for non-substance related addiction such as gambling and Internet 
use. 
 Robinson & Berridge (1993) further expanded this notion by providing a 
biological explanation, specifically a dopaminergic interaction that came to be known 
as the incentive-sensitisation theory. The general idea of the theory is that when we 
use a substance we initiate a dopaminergic reaction that becomes sensitised with 
subsequent use. This gradually attributes salient properties to the addictive 
behaviour and leads to motivating the user to abuse again. The above can explain 
AB as an extension of substance abuse. Addiction related stimuli could also be 
associated with this dopaminergic interaction hence motivate the user to abuse. This 
incentive driven motivation could elicit preferential processing for addiction related 
stimuli. The claims by Robinson and Berridge also provide support to Tiffany's (1990) 
cognitive model of drug use where addictive behaviour is mainly disciplined by 
automatic processes. Hence, any AB effects could even occur without the user’s 
awareness.  
 Franken (2003) provided further support for the incentive-sensitisation theory 
by proposing that the AB bias effects are merely a result of classical conditioning. 
When addiction related cues trigger the dopaminergic interaction they acquire salient 
properties and become the centre of attention that later on could lead to craving and 





treatment could explain the AB effects. Furthermore, if the user abstains, the urge 
and craving to use could increase these AB effects due to a reciprocal relation 
between the addiction related stimuli and the dopaminergic activation (Ryan, 2002).  
 A further explanation for AB comes from the theory of current concerns 
(Klinger & Cox, 2004). The authors define as current concerns a time-binding brain 
process that motivates us to notice and act upon stimuli that are related to our 
current goal. In terms of addictive behaviour such as gambling, this could mean that 
when a gambler has a goal to engage with gambling activity he/she would notice and 
react to gambling related stimuli. This gambling primed state of mind could explain a 
possible preferential treatment of gambling related stimuli that could trigger AB.   
 One could argue that all the above theories share a common aspect of 
addiction related stimuli are processed automatically and activate a behavioural 
cycle leading to increased urge and craving to use as well as AB effects. One theory 
that attempted to bring together automatic processes and craving to use was the 
elaborated intrusion theory (EI) as proposed by Kavanagh, Andrade, and May 
(2005). EI proposes that external cues can initially activate automatic desire 
thoughts. By then elaborating on these desire thoughts increased craving occurs that 
further enhances the effects of external stimuli. This cycle can explain AB as a result 
of associated thoughts that reduce the cognitive resources available to supress the 
effects of external cues (see Figure 1). 
  Even though EI was originally proposed for substance use, it could be easily 
generalised to non-substance addictions such as gambling and Internet use. It is 
also important to note that EI highlights the importance of both attentional and 
working memory resources in order for the subjective state of desire to be initiated 
and maintained. EI predicts that by reducing the availability of attentional resources 
one could reduce the amount of intrusive thoughts. Furthermore, by limiting the 
availability of working memory resources one could restrict the level of elaboration. 
Even though restricting attentional resources, in the form of attention training, has 
been fairly researched, the same cannot be said for the role of working memory 
resources (May, Kavanagh, & Andrade, 2015). In Chapter 5, we will investigate the 






Figure 1. The Elaborative Intrusion Theory as presented in Kavanagh, Andrade, and May (2005) 
 
Evidence of AB from Addiction Modified Paradigms 
 As already stated AB is a quite robust phenomenon that has been researched 
for decades using a variety of experimental paradigms. One of the most commonly 
used paradigm is the Addiction Modified Stroop task. Participants are presented 
with either words or images through a coloured layered and are instructed to ignore 
the content of the image or the word and report the colour as fast and as accurately 
as they can. Typically, for the Addiction Modified task, half of the stimuli are addiction 





slower at reporting the colour of addiction related stimuli compared to neutral stimuli 
(alcohol related task: Bauer & Cox, 1998). Furthermore, in addiction modified Stroop 
tasks a more common finding is that addiction abusers are typically slower at 
reporting the colour of addiction related stimuli compared to healthy control 
participants (alcohol related task: Cox, Fadardi, & Pothos, 2006). These findings are 
quite consistent across different types of addiction (for a review see Field & Cox, 
2008), including Pathological or Problem Gambling (for a review see Hønsi, 
Mentzoni, Molde, & Pallesen, 2013). Specifically, for gambling, as it is one of the two 
focuses of this thesis, the findings have been very consistent; gamblers have been 
slower at reporting the colour of gambling related stimuli compared to neutral words. 
No such difference was observed for the control groups (e.g., Boyer & Dickerson, 
2003b; Molde et al., 2010). 
 Another task that has been used to investigate AB is the visual probe task. 
The task involves presenting simultaneously two stimuli on a computer screen, one 
addiction related and a neutral one. Once the stimuli disappear, a visual probe is 
presented in the place of one of the two original stimuli. Participants have to respond 
to the visual probe as fast as they can. AB is observed when pathological users are 
quicker to respond to probes that replace addiction related stimuli compared to 
probes that replace neutral stimuli (for a general addiction review see: ( Munafò & 
Albery, 2006). This AB has also been demonstrated in gambling modified visual 
probe tasks (Vizcaino et al., 2013) with gamblers being quicker to respond to probes 
replacing gambling related stimuli compared to neutral ones. No such difference was 
observed in the healthy control group. 
 The flicker-induced change blindness (flicker ICB) has also been used to 
investigate AB in addiction. The task involves the quick presentation of pairs of 
images, with a blank image in between them, in quick succession that creates the 
sensation of flickering. The two images will differ in two small details/objects and will 
perpetually be presented on the screen until the participant can spot one for the two 
changes. Typically, when a change occurs it will result in a motion signal at the 
location of the change. However, with the blank image interfering the motion signal is 
now directed towards the entire image, thus resulting in difficulty in detecting the 
occurred change. This is known as change blindness. For the addiction modified 
task, one changed detail/object would be addiction related (salient) and one neutral. 





findings have been reported across different types of addiction (e.g., heroin: Bearre 
et al., 2007; cannabis: B. Jones, Jones, Blundell, & Bruce, 2002; alcohol: B. T. 
Jones, Bruce, Livingstone, & Reed, 2006a; gambling: Brevers et al., 2011). Brevers 
et al. (2011) combined the flicker ICB task with eye-tracking and reported that 
gamblers showed more initial engagement with gambling related stimuli (initial 
directions and fixation time) compared to neutral stimuli. This was not the case for 
the control group.  
 Eye tracking has been used across different forms of addiction combined with 
some of the behavioural paradigms mentioned above. Specifically, when combined 
with the visual probe task research has shown that problematic use participants 
exhibited increased fixation times towards addiction related stimuli compared to 
neutral stimuli (e.g., alcohol: Christiansen, Mansfield, Duckworth, Field, & Jones, 
2015; cocaine: Marks, Pike, Stoops, & Rush, 2014a; smoking: Kang et al., 2012; 
Meernik et al., 2016). Besides eye tracking other direct measurement methods 
include event-related potentials (ERP) and functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI). However, these studies were focusing more on inhibition, neural responses, 
and brain damage and not AB per se (for a review see Marhe, Luijten, & Franken, 
2014).   
 In conclusion, we can argue that AB towards addiction related stimuli has 
been operationalised by a number of different behavioural paradigms and has been 
measured either directly or indirectly. The Addiction Modified Stroop task appears to 
be the most prevalent task. Even though this task has been used for investigating 
gambling AB the same cannot be said for Facebook/Internet AB. Furthermore, time 
perception paradigms have not been used in conjunction with gambling nor 
Facebook/Internet related stimuli. Either to investigate the direct impact of addiction 
related stimuli on our time perception or using time perception distortions as an 
indirect measurement of AB. 
  
Time Perception 
 Time has been at the centre of human skepsis for centuries with 
representations in ancient theologies, arts, and philosophy. Kant in his Critique of 
Pure Reason proposed that we are born with senses of time and space. It is 





centre of sciences and specifically physics for millennia with Aristotle proposing that 
time is a sort of number that is defined as the difference between what was and what 
is. For psychology and human behaviour time has been research since the early 
days of the science, the 19th century, with Fechner arguing that the sense of time or 
sense of judging duration should be regarded as an innate sense like hearing and 
vision.  
 Despite the early interest in the study of sense of time, psychologists only 
started formulating plausible theories in the second half of the 20th century. Even 
though experimental work on time perception was as old as 1850s with Vierordt’s 
Law stating that we humans tend to reproduce short durations as longer and long 
durations as shorter. In a sense, we tend to gravitate towards central durations (as 
reported in Lejeune & Wearden, 2009). Early 1960s saw scientists Creelman, in 
1962, and Treisman in 1963, proposing internal clock models (ICM) that will later be 
defined in more detail by Gibbon (1977) and Church and Gibbon (1982). 
Furthermore, Church and Gibbon expanding on their previous work and together 
with Meck formulated the scalar expectancy theory (SET, 1984). Furthermore, Zakay 
and Block (1995) expanded on the model by highlighting the role of attention in 
prospective temporal events. 
 SET expanded on Treisman’s work and included three distinct stages, the 
clock stage, the memory stage, and the decision stage. It is also worth noting that 
SET has seen a number of different adaptations, for a more recent one see Figure 2 
as it was presented in Sylvie Droit-Volet and Meck (2007). The clock stage includes 
three key mechanisms, the pacemaker, the mode switch and the accumulator. The 
variable-rate pacemaker is generating pulses from the onset to the end of an event 
and is sensitive to arousal. In a similar manner as a physical clock ticks every 
second. These pulses reach the accumulator that acts like a storage facility. The 
mode switch, when we are focused on the event, allows these pulses to make it to 
the accumulator, in other words the switch is ON. When we get distracted, the mode 
switch opens, goes to OFF position, and some of the pulses do not make it to the 
accumulator.  
 The memory stage involves the elements of working memory and reference 
memory. In the reference memory, we have stored previous temporal experiences. 
For example, in the case of the temporal bisection task that will discuss later on we 





event. In the working memory, we temporarily store our experienced current event. 
Finally, at the decision stage we have the comparator that helps us decide whether 
the duration of the current event is matching what we have in our reference memory 
or not. It is easy for anyone to see that one of the strengths of this model lie in its 
simplicity and clear associations with different cognitive mechanisms such as 
attention, arousal, and memory.  
 
Figure 2. A generalised conceptual representation of ICM as guided by the SET principles 
(Sylvie Droit-Volet & Meck, 2007) 
 
 Indeed, research in time perception has already provided evidence of how 
manipulating arousal can distort our time perception. Drew et al., (2003) 
administered D1 and D2 antagonists to rats that were trained to produce 12 and 36s. 
Their findings suggested that when a D2 antagonist was administered rats to 
overestimate their time production, which indicated a decelerated pacemaker.  
Furthermore, Cheng, Ali, and Meck (2007) demonstrated that increasing arousal by 
administering cocaine to rats that had received minimal training led to lengthening 
their experience due to an accelerated pacemaker. Contrary, administering cocaine 
to rats that had received extensive training did not yield the same results. 
Furthermore, in the case of rats with extended training, when also administered with 





minimal training rats was observed. Therefore, by biochemically affecting the arousal 
levels we can affect the perceived passage of time. 
 Similar effects were also observed when repetitive audio stimuli, clicks, were 
used to accelerate and decelerate the pacemaker. A typical example of such 
research is the one carried out by Wearden, Philpott, and Win (1999) where clicks 
either timed with a faster clock or a normal clock were presented together two tones. 
Participants had to judge which of the two tones was longer. Evidence suggested 
that tones presented with the faster paced click were judged to last longer. Thus, 
providing support that an increased pacemaker could result in overestimate time. 
These effects on the pacemaker can also be observed when the pacemaker would 
be accelerated using visual stimuli, flickers. Ortega and Lopez (2008) used the 
temporal bisection task in conjunction with flickering stimuli. The temporal bisection 
task involves training participants to discriminate two standards, one of short 
duration and one of long duration, and then asking them to classify duration in-
between these two standards as either short or long (for more details see the second 
part of this chapter regarding the Experimental Paradigms). The findings were similar 
to audio click results. Participants would overestimate time for flickering stimuli as a 
result of an accelerated pacemaker. 
 Further from biochemical and repetition effects, temporal distortions due to 
arousal have also been demonstrated with emotional stimuli. Tipples in 2008 used 
angry, happy, fearful, and neutral faces as stimuli in a temporal bisection task. 
Results indicated that the durations of angry faces were overestimated compared to 
all other facial expressions. Which could be an indication of accelerated pacemaker 
in the presence of threatening stimuli. This finding is consistent with numerous other 
studies involving emotional stimuli (e.g., Cheng, Tipples, Narayanan, & Meck, 2016; 
Sylvie Droit-Volet & Meck, 2007a; Gil & Droit-Volet, 2009, 2012a; Mella, Conty, & 
Pouthas, 2011; Noulhiane, Mella, Samson, Ragot, & Pouthas, 2007; Tipples, 2011).  
 Emotional content however, could also have an impact on the mode switch. 
Specifically, emotional stimuli could grab our attention while we are experiencing an 
event, resulting in opening the mode switch, thus losing some of the generated 
pulses. This should result in underestimating time as fewer pulses reach the 
accumulator. Tipples in  2010 employed a temporal bisection task using sexual 
taboo words and other words with different levels of arousal and valence. His results 





taboo words, providing support to the notion that taboo words can grab our attention. 
This finding is in line with the predictions made by Zakay and Block (1996) regarding 
the role of attention and attention shifting.  
 However, one could ask how can we distinguish between arousal and 
attentional effects, as stimuli can be arousing and accelerate the pacemaker and at 
the same time, they can grab our attention and open the mode switch. One possible 
answer to this is that opening the mode switch should have a constant subtracting 
effect on our time perception across different durations. Whereas arousal effects 
should produce increasing effects as durations increase. For example, when we are 
experiencing two separate events of 400 and 1600ms attentional effects should be 
similar for both durations. That would result in a perception of 300 and 1500ms 
respectively. On the other hand, if we have arousal effects the distortion for 1600ms 
should be a multiple of the distortion of the 400ms. So 400ms could feel like 500ms 
and 1600ms like 2000ms. In this thesis, we will also propose a different approach 
where the point of subjective equality should be used for attentional effects and 
Weber’s ratio should be used for arousal effects. More details on this claim and 
justification on their use will be presented in Chapter 3. 
Investigation Rationale 
 By examining the addiction theories mentioned above and the ICM one can 
easily highlight that are mechanisms that are present in both. Specifically in EI, the 
role of attention towards external salient stimuli could have direct implications on our 
time perception when we are exposed to such stimuli. One should expect that salient 
stimuli should distract us from timekeeping thus resulting in underestimating time. 
Furthermore, EI also implies that memory resources are crucial for this 
intrusive/elaborative cycle to occur therefore, it should be interesting to investigate 
what is the impact of memory load on the intrusive salient stimuli and how that would 
impact our time perception. Specifically, since ICM require memory resources both 
for maintaining the temporal standards and the current experienced event. Finally, EI 
and also the incentive-sensitisation theory also predict that salient stimuli should 
have an dopaminergic effect, thus affect our arousal levels, which should have a 
direct effect on our pacemaker and time perception overall. 
 Therefore, exploring the effects of attention, arousal, and memory load on the 





valuable insights for both the fields of addictions and time perception. 
 
Experimental Paradigms and Methodological Considerations 
 For the purposes of this thesis, a number of different experimental paradigms 
was employed. Below each paradigm will be discussed briefly highlighting the 
reasoning behind its use and discussing methodological considerations. The 
paradigms are mentioned in the order that are reported in the thesis. 
1. Addiction Modified Stroop tasks: Chapter 2 
2. Addiction Modified Temporal Bisection task (Gambling): Chapter 3 
3. Addiction Modified Temporal Bisection task (Facebook/Internet): Chapter 4 
4. Memory Association Temporal Bisection task (Facebook/Internet): Chapter 4 
5. N-back and Sternberg tasks: Chapter 5 
Addiction Modified Stroop tasks 
 The Stroop task in its traditional form was proposed by Stroop (1935) and it 
involved the presentation of colour words written either in the same or different ink 
colour. Trials could be either congruent (e.g., word “GREEN” written in green ink) or 
incongruent (e.g., word “GREEN” written in blue ink). Participants were usually 
instructed to name the colour of the ink and ignore the colour word itself. Any 
differences in reaction time (RT) between congruent and incongruent trials are 
known as Stroop effect. In addition, control trials could be added with non-colour 
related stimuli written in different ink colours (e.g., “XXXX” written in blue ink). This 
would allow research to further discriminate between interference Stroop effect 
(difference between incongruent and neutral trials) and facilitating Stroop effect 
(difference between congruent and neutral trials). It has been proposed that the 
Stroop effect is the result of conflicting process that prevent us from ignoring 
irrelevant to the task information (Macleod, 1991).  
 Even though the original version of Stroop involved only colour words and ink 
colours, the paradigm has since evolved and a number of variations have been use 
in research. One such variation is the emotional Stroop task either in word or 





& Hornig, 2001; de Ruiter & Brosschot, 1994; Frings, Englert, Wentura, & 
Bermeitinger, 2010; Mark, Williams, Mathews, & Macleod, 1996; McKenna & 
Sharma, 2004; Phaf & Kan, 2007). The emotional Stroop involves presentation of 
stimuli that can be emotionally loaded (either words or images). In the case of word 
version, words are written in different ink colours and in the case of the pictorial 
version, each picture is presented through a coloured filtered. Research has 
consistently shown that anxious individuals, or individuals with phobias, are slower in 
reporting the colour for emotional stimuli compared to neutral stimuli. This threat 
related bias can be referred as emotional Stroop effect.  
 For the purposes of this thesis, we developed two further variations of the 
pictorial emotional Stroop task. One gambling-modified Stroop task and one 
Facebook/Internet modified Stroop task. Gambling-modified Stroop tasks have been 
used before (e.g., Boyer & Dickerson, 2003) and demonstrated slower RTs for 
naming the colour of gambling related words compared to neutral words for Poker 
players only. Our version was a pictorial one and aimed to replicate such findings 
(Chapter 3, Exp1). A Facebook/Internet modified Stroop task  (Chapter 3, Exp2) has 
not been used before and our aim was to discover similar slower RTs for the salient 
stimuli compared to the neutral ones. 
Addiction Modified Temporal Bisection tasks 
 As discussed earlier in ICM and SET one of the challenges in research of 
timing and time estimation is the isolation of individual components of the theoretical 
constructs. Specifically, distinguishing the effects of the pacemaker from the effects 
of the switch. One common task used in relevant research is the Temporal Bisection 
task (TB). The TB involves training participants in two standards, one of short 
duration and one of long duration. This training phase is followed-up by a test phase 
where stimuli are presented in a number of different durations between short and 
long. Participants are asked to classify them into one of the two standards by 
responding SHORT (S) or LONG (L); (Note: Below, the letters S and L will be used 
to denote participants’ response and not actual duration). The purpose of the TB task 
is to estimate the point of subjective equality where a participants transitions from 
responding S to responding L. For example if a participant is presented with stimuli 
in durations of 200, 400, 600, 800, and 1000ms and analysis reveals that he/she 





Bisection Point (TBP).  
 Originally, Wearden (1991) proposed that the TBP should be equal to the 
arithmetic mean or else TBP = (short + long) / 2. However, his data contradicted his 
own theoretical model, indicating that the TBP could be close to the theoretical mean 
but still below it. More interestingly, in the case of ambiguous durations participants 
tended to respond L in most of the trials. This indicated a bias that automatically 
discarded the notion of the TBP located at the arithmetic mean. To account for this 
bias, Allan and Gibbon (1991) proposed the use of the geometric mean adjusted by 
the bias for L (β). This resulted in TBP= �𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 ×𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝛽𝛽  . The strength of both methods 
is that they account/acknowledge response biases and the role of memory in timing 
(due to short and long standards being stored in working memory). However, both 
methods were inaccurate when matched with experimental data.  
 Wearden and Ferrara (1996) finally proposed that the S & L responses should 
not be expected to be placed on a linear pattern. Instead, they proposed that 
depending on the duration of the stimulus the S & L responses should resemble a 
logarithmic distribution. Even though this solution had its flaws, it accounted for 
timing performance more accurately (Kopec & Brody, 2010). Building on this 
logarithmic notion, all TBP in this thesis were calculated using probit analysis that 
takes the assumption of the logarithmic distribution into account when estimating the 
point of subjective equality (more on the Bisection Point technical calculations in 
Chapter 4, Exp3).   
 Moving away from the psychometric calculations behind the TB task it is also 
important to highlight why this task was ideal for the purposes of this thesis. Previous 
research employing this experimental paradigm has identified that this task can 
detect both attentional and arousal effects (e.g., Sylvie Droit-Volet & Meck, 2007b; 
Gil & Droit-Volet, 2009, 2012a; Tipples, 2008, 2011). Attentional effects would 
typically result in a horizontal shift in our performance Figure 3, whereas arousal 
effects would result in “steeper” curves in our performance. Therefore, using the TB 
task would not just reveal information regarding distorted time perception but would 







Figure 3. Typical attentional effects where we can clearly observe a horizontal shift between 
the two curves. As presented in Gil and Droit-Volet, 2011 
 
Memory Association Temporal Bisection task 
 During the course of this research, criticism arose on whether the observed 
temporal distortion effects were due to emotional content of the salient stimuli or 
whether it was simply a familiarity effect. Block, Hancock, and Zakay (2010) carried 
out a meta-analytic review investigating the impact of different factors in time 
perception. One of these factors was familiarity, and the authors found no effect size 
differences between low and high conditions. Despite this finding, we wanted to be 
even more certain that our effects were not due to familiarity.  
 We did that by training participants to associate non-words with salient and 
neutral stimuli. We then employed the Temporal Bisection task using learnt and not 
learnt (novel) non-words instead of the original pictorial stimuli. We used a similar 
methodology as in Sharma and Money (2010) with the key differences that the 
participants completed a Temporal Bisection task and not a Stroop task. One further 
strength of this experimental paradigm is that it would weaken any criticism on 
whether specific pictorial details of the salient stimuli could be driving the effects and 
not their actual emotional content.  
The N-Back and Sternberg tasks 





are guided by arousal and attentional processes, also includes components that 
involve working memory (WM). It would therefore add to our scientific knowledge 
regarding the how the ICM operates when we are exposed to addiction related 
stimuli. Furthermore, by loading our WM we are also loading executive control 
functions, which in turn typically results in increased distractors effects (Lavie & De 
Fockert, 2005). This could have direct implications on the effects of addiction related 
stimuli on time perception. 
 First, we employed an N-back task, which was originally developed by 
Kirchner (1958). The task involves the presentation of stimuli on sequential order 
and the participant has to respond whether the current stimulus matches the 
stimulus presented previously. Specifically, the task commonly has four variations, 0-
back, 1-back, 2-back, 3-back. In the 1-back variation the participant has to respond 
whether the current stimulus matches the exact previous one, in the 2-back whether 
it matches the one presented two trials prior, and the 3-back whether it matches the 
one presented three trials prior. The 0-back involves no WM manipulation, as the 
participants do not have to do any matching. As expected, increasing the value of N 
increases also the WM load and decreases accuracy of responses.  
 Secondly, we employed a Sternberg task which was originally developed by 
Sternberg (1966). The task involves a learning and a testing phase. During the 
learning phase participants have to memorise a number of characters that are 
presented rapidly in succession. Then in the test phase, characters are presented 
and participants have to respond whether the current character was presented 
during the learning phase. The key difference between the N-back and the Sternberg 
task is that the latter does not involve an update stage.  
 The Sternberg task relies heavily on short-term memory capacity as 
participants are only required to maintain the learnt set of characters in mind for the 
entire duration of the experiment. Thus, employing mainly the visuo-spatial 
sketchpad without the need to draw upon more cognitive resources such as the 
executive attention. However, the same cannot be said about the N-back task as 
constant processing and manipulation of the stored information is required (with the 
exception of the 0-back). Therefore, executive attention is needed to constantly 
coordinate the processes of retrieving memory content, compare it with the current 
stimulus, and update its content.  





stimulus was part of the originally learnt characters. Once they respond “yes” or “no” 
this stimulus is no longer needed and no deliberate effort should be made to 
maintain in WM. In the N-back task however, the current stimulus, after responding 
whether it matches or not a previous one, it then needs to be store so it can be 
compared to an upcoming stimulus. For example, in the 1-back variation we start by 
maintaining the first stimulus, we then compared the second stimulus to the first and 
respond whether they are the same or not. Furthermore, we need to deliberately 
update the “remembered item”, meaning removing the first stimulus from memory 
and replacing it with the second stimulus. In other words, the updating process 
involves replacing an item in memory. This becomes even more effortful in the 2-
back task. We now have to match the current stimulus with the one presented two 
trials ago. After we respond “yes” or “no” we then need to store this stimulus in a 
temporary memory slot and then after the next trial “shift” it to the remembered item 
position. Hence, the updating process now involves replacing and shifting. 
 For the purposes of this thesis, we only employed 1-back and 2-back, as the 
0-back would not manipulate cognitive load and the 3-back would have been too 
difficult in a dual task paradigm. Similarly, for the Sternberg task we employed low 
and high load by presenting four and eight characters to memorise respectively.  
 
Research Questions by Chapter 
 As mentioned earlier, this thesis examined the effects of addiction related 
stimuli on time perception, specifically gambling and Facebook/Internet related ones. 
Before proceeding to exclusively, time perception related investigations we wanted 
first to establish that gambling and Facebook/Internet related stimuli could elicit 
attentional bias effects.  
 In Chapter 2 therefore, we focused on investigating such effects by using a 
robust paradigm such as the Addiction Modified Stroop task. Specifically, we wanted 
to replicate previous findings related to gambling and Stroop effect and expand that 
to Facebook/Internet Stroop Effect. 
 In Chapter 3, we wanted to investigate whether gambling related stimuli could 
distort our time perception. We then explored this effect further by presenting 





 In Chapter 4, we wanted to investigate whether Facebook/Internet related 
stimuli could distort our time perception as gambling did. We then proceeded in 
investigating these effects further by exploring the role of repetition, semantic 
priming, and familiarity.  
 In Chapter 5, we wanted to manipulate the memory load and in extend the 
cognitive load and investigate what would the implications be on the ICM when 






 : STROOP TASK AND ADDICTION RELATED 
STIMULI 
 Attentional bias towards addiction related stimuli has been researched 
extensively in the last 30 years (Field & Cox, 2008) and it is now considered to be a 
robust phenomenon, even though the mechanisms behind it are still, to a degree, not 
fully determined (Ciccarelli et al., 2016). Specifically in addiction, attentional bias 
refers to preferable allocation of attentional resources towards addiction related 
stimuli (Matt Field & Cox, 2008; Franken, 2003; Tiffany, 1990).  
 Addiction models predict that due to selective attention addicts will tend to 
addiction related stimuli more than neutral stimuli (Franken, 2003). This increased 
attention can lead to increased dopaminergic activity that can reinforce attentional 
bias further, leading to a vicious circle. Furthermore, addiction related cues can 
initiate a circle of desire and associated thoughts that will make shifting attention 
away from addiction stimuli more difficult (The Elaborative Intrusion Theory of Desire 
(EI), Kavanagh, Andrade, & May, 2005). The above highlight the connection 
between external cues and activation of automated processes that in turn activate 
non-automated schemata related to substance use and relapse (Tiffany, 1990). 
Experiment 1: Gambling Modified Stroop Task 
 Due to the complex nature of attention as a system, attentional bias can have 
either positive or negative effects on human performance. In an experiment by Field, 
Eastwood, Bradley, and Mogg (2006) cannabis users, compared to non-users, were 
faster at approaching responses related to cannabis cues but it also took them 
longer to divert their attention off the cannabis related stimuli. Similar findings have 
been documented across the spectrum of substance addiction (Cane et al., 2009; 
Copersino et al., 2004; Ehrman et al., 2002; Matt Field et al., 2006b; Marks, Pike, 
Stoops, & Rush, 2014b; Miller & Fillmore, 2011; Marcus Munafò, Mogg, Roberts, 
Bradley, & Murphy, 2003; Oliver & Drobes, 2015; Wilcockson & Pothos, 2015). 
 Similarly, to the above substance addiction related examples, attentional bias 
can also be observed with non-substance related addictions, behavioural addictions. 
In behavioural addictions such as gambling, online gaming, or general Internet 





addiction related stimuli. A number of studies have already investigated attentional 
bias in gambling using a variety of paradigms. In modified Stroop tasks (Boyer & 
Dickerson, 2003a; McCusker & Gettings, 1997) gamblers demonstrate higher 
reaction times in reporting the colour of salient stimuli compared to neutral stimuli. In  
Posner tasks (Ciccarelli et al., 2016) gamblers demonstrated a facilitation in spotting 
gambling stimuli and attended to them for longer (disengagement bias). In eye-
tracking studies (Brevers et al., 2011) gamblers demonstrated faster reaction times, 
increased fixation duration, and increased number of initial saccades towards salient 
stimuli compared to neutral ones, for review see Holst (2013), Molde et al. (2010).  
 Addiction related Stroop effect is a robust finding in addiction research (Cox, 
Fadardi, & Pothos, 2006b). By Addiction Stroop effect we refer to the increased 
reaction time (RT) in reporting the colour of a salient stimulus compared to a neutral 
stimulus. This effect is the manifestation of the salient content of the current stimulus 
on how fast we respond its colour and it is known as a fast effect.  The investigation 
of the fast and slow Stroop effects (as it will be described below) has allowed us to 
explore further the mechanisms behind attentional processes. 
  McKenna and Sharma (2004) identified that besides the existence of a fast 
effect, slower RT in naming the colour of a salient current stimulus compared to a 
neutral current stimulus, there is also a slow effect which is a slowdown in naming 
the colour of current neutral stimulus when it follows a salient stimulus compared to 
when it follows a neutral stimulus. The authors even suggested that the actual fast 
effect has a very small impact in the interference. However, Frings, Englert, 
Wentura, and Bermeitinger, (2010) argued that both fast and slow effects play an 
important role and this could be due to two possible reasons. First, there could be 
two separate attentional mechanisms and automated one and a more controlled one, 
with the fast effect associated with the automated one and the slow effect associated 
with the more controlled one. Second, there could be just one attentional mechanism 
with the fast effect revealing an interference process and the slow effect a 
disengagement process that carries over to the next stimulus.   
 The hypothesis is that was that frequent poker players would be slower at 
reporting the colour of gambling related stimuli compared to neutral stimuli, this 
would not be observed in non-players. Furthermore, fast and slow effect analysis 





Experiment 1: Method 
Participants 
 In total, 37 participants were recruited for this experiment (22 males and 15 
females). All participants were students at the University of Kent aged between 18 
and 28 (M = 20.35, SD = 2.00). Participants in the control group (N = 19) were 
Psychology students, they were recruited via the Kent RPS website and received 
course credits. Participants in the poker group (N = 18) were members of the Kent 
University Poker Society and participating in this experiment allowed them to take 
part in a Poker tournament for free. The usual cost for registering in a similar Poker 
tournament would be £3, which is equivalent to the two RPS credits that were given 
to the control group participants. 
Design 
 This was a mixed design experiment defined by Group (Poker, Control) x 
Image (Gambling(G), Neutral(N). Group was a between-subjects factor and Image 
was a within-subjects factor. The dependent variable was the reaction time (RT) it 
took participants to respond the colour of the presented filtered image. 
Materials 
 Hardware and software. The study was conducted in the labs of the School 
of Psychology where each participant was alone in an individual cubicle. The 
experiment was presented on a Psychology department Dell desktop computer with 
a 19 inches monitor (4:3 factor). The custom computer software used to present the 
stimuli was programmed in Psychopy v1.83 (Peirce, 2007, 2009). 
 Visual stimuli. Google images (“Google,” 2015) and “gambling images” as a 
search criterion were used. Twenty-four images were selected with items commonly 
associated with gambling such as roulette, dice, poker chips, and cards. Such items 
have been used before in gambling related research (eg., Brevers et al., 2011). For 
each gambling object an image was selected with a neutral object that had similar 
physical and visual properties such as shape, colour, and size. Furthermore, ten 
additional neutral objects were selected to be used in the practice trials.  
 All of the above images were resized to 1,024x768 pixels and were converted 





These were red (255, 0, 0), green (0, 255, 0), blue (0, 0, 255) and yellow (255, 255, 
0) with 40% opacity. This resulted in a total of 192 images. A similar procedure was 
also followed in order to create a collection of 40 stimuli (10 items filter for the above 
four colours), leading to a final collection of 232 stimuli. This time the search term 
was “office equipment” and the final 40 images were used during the Stroop training 
phase. It should also be mentioned that all image sizes were less than 200kb to 
avoid discrepancies in loading times. For detailed stimuli, see Appendix A. 
 Questionnaires. The committee of the Kent University Poker society agreed 
to advertise the study to its members with the agreement that the experiment will not 
take longer than 10 minutes. This imposed restraints to the number of the 
questionnaires that we could use to assess gambling severity. In order to keep the 
experiment at ten minutes participants only reported gender and age and were 
asked one question that would assess their Poker playing frequency. This item was 
“In the field below type in how many poker games you play in a week (both cash and 
tournaments, online or not”.  
Procedure 
 Participants were first briefed about the experiment, provided their consent, 
and then entered an individual cubicle in order to complete the experiment. Once the 
experiment started, they were offered instructions on the screen that they would see 
images, one at a time, through coloured filters, red, green, blue, or yellow. Their task 
was to ignore the content of the image and report the colour as quickly and as 
accurately as they could. Reporting the colour was done by pressing the 
corresponding keys on the keyboard that coloured stickers were placed on (red:’A’, 
green:’S’, blue:’k’, yellow:’l’). Once participants were happy with the instructions they 
could press ‘space’ and the training phase would begin. The training phase was 
comprised of 40 trials with no inter-trial pause. Once a response key was pressed 
the next image would come on the screen with a frame buffer delay varying from 
0ms to 16.7ms. After the training phase finished the experiment would pause and 
present the same instructions as earlier. By pressing ‘space’ the testing phase of the 
experiment would begin that comprised of 384 trials (2 repetitions of 192 unique 
trials) that were presented in random order. Finally, participants reported their 
gender, age, and how may poker games they played a week. Upon completion of the 







 The answer from the Poker frequency question was entered in a one-way 
ANOVA with Group (Poker, Control) being the between-subjects factor. There was a 
significant difference between the two groups, F(1, 36) = 9.07, p = .005, η2p = .206, 
(Poker: M = 9.28, SD = 13.16; Control: M = 0.05, SD = 0.23, numbers represent 
games per week). In the Control Group only one participant reported one game per 
week with the rest reporting zero games per week. In the Poker Group three 
participants reported more than 30 games a week and the rest reported less than ten 
games a week. Even when treating these three players as outliers and removing 
them from the ANOVA the result of the comparison remained significant (F(1, 33) = 
55.930, p < .001, η2p = .636). It was decided to leave these participants in the 
analysis.  
Stroop Data Preparation 
 Prior to the data analysis the first trial and all other trials with incorrect 
responses for each participant were removed. This resulted in dropping 37 first trials 
and 773 trials with incorrect responses (originally 14,208 trials, 5.44% incorrect 
responses). Furthermore, all trials with response time outside ±3SD’s based on each 
participant and condition specific mean were also removed. This resulted in dropping 
a further 226 trials leaving 13,172. Also, all trials with responses faster to 300ms 
were removed resulting in a final sample that contained 13,163 trials (the overall 
reduction from original sample to final sample was 7.35%). 
Analysis of Errors 
 A two-way mixed analysis of variance for ratio of errors over total trials was 
conducted with Group (Poker, Control) as a between-subjects factor and Image (G, 
N) as a within-subjects factor. Both the main effects and the interaction were non-
significant, all F’s < 0.85 and all p’s > .363.  
Reaction Time Analysis 





(Poker, Control) and Image (G, N). There was no significant main effect of Image, 
F(1, 35) = 1.38, p = .248, η2p = .038, with observed power (1-β) = .21 (α = .05)1. 
There was a significant interaction of Image x Group, F(1, 35) = 7.13, p = .011, η2p = 
.169, with observed power (1-β) = .74 (α = .05). Further pairwise comparisons with 
Bonferroni adjustment revealed a significant simple effect of Image for the Poker 
group (p = .011, Gambling: M = 810.12ms, SD = 95.74; Neutral: M = 788.53ms, SD 
= 97.91ms). There was no simple effect of Image for the Control group (p = .248, 
Gambling: M = 883.13, SD = 145.04; Neutral: M = 891.54, SD = 140.37ms). This 
suggests that the Poker group was significantly slower at reporting the colour of 
Gambling stimuli compared to Neutral stimuli, as predicted in our hypothesis. Finally, 
there was a main effect of Group, F(1, 35) = 4.86, p = .034, η2p = .122, with observed 
power (1-β) = .57 (α = .05). This suggests that overall, the Poker group was faster at 
reporting the image colour (M = 799.32ms, SD = 96.06ms) compared to the Control 
group (M = 887.33ms, SD = 140.85ms).  
Group Effect Investigation 
 The above finding of the Poker group being faster than the Control group 
presented the question whether this speed difference could be driving the simple 
effect of Image in the Poker group. To answer this question, we carried out a further 
analysis where we compared similar speed RTs between the two groups. We 
grouped the RTs per participant and Image in four bins. Then we calculated the 
difference of z-scores between the Gambling RT and Neutral RT for each participant 
and each bin. This resulted in four difference scores, Bin (b1, b2, b3, b4). We then 
ran a two-way ANOVA with Group (Poker, Control) and Bin (b1, b2, b3, b4). There 
was no significant main effect of Bin nor a significant interaction of Group by Bin 
(both F’s < 2.217, p’s > .090). This suggests that the differences in reporting the 
colour in the Poker group were not due to being overall faster. As expected, there 
was a main effect of Group, F(1, 35) = 6.68, p = .014, η2p = .160, with observed power 
(1-β) = .71 (α = .05), suggesting that the differences were greater for the Poker 
group. Moreover, these differences seem to increase as we move from the first to 
 
1 All observed power reported throughout this thesis were calculated as post-hoc power analysis 






the fourth Bin indicating that attentional effects are greater as the RT gets higher, 
see Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Differences in reaction times between Gambling and Neutral stimuli per group. Each Bin 
is represented by its mean reaction time. 
 
Fast and Slow Effect Analyses 
 Furthermore, we also analysed correct reaction times in terms of fast and 
slow effects. We ran two separate two-way ANOVA with Group and Image (slow 
effect: current Neutral with previous Gambling vs. current Neutral with previous 
Neutral; fast effect: current Neutral with previous Neutral vs. current Gambling with 
previous Neutral). Both analyses revealed no significant main effects nor interactions 
(all F’s < 1.691, all p’s > .202). In order to investigate more what was driving the 
differences in RTs for the Gambling Group we explored whether the two previous 
trials stimuli would impact the RT for the current stimuli. Including the current trial, we 
formed triads of trials and separated them in two categories, triads with at least two 
(AL2) Gambling stimuli (GGG, GMG, MGG, GGM) and triads with at most one (AM1) 
Gambling stimulus (MMM, MMG, MGM, GMM). We then compared the RTs of these 
two categories for the Gambling Group (the same took place for the Control Group 
and as expected there were no significant differences). On average AL2 trials had 





786.25ms, SD = 99.64ms). This difference was significant t (17) = 3.786, p = .001, η2p 
= .457, with observed power (1-β) = .99 (α = .05). The above result suggests that 
attentional bias effects triggered by the presence of a Gambling stimulus are 
enhanced by the existence of a second Gambling stimulus within the immediate triad 
of trials.  
Experiment 1: Discussion 
 The aim of the current experiment was to show that gambling related stimuli 
could cause attentional bias effects. Specifically, the hypothesis was that Poker 
players would be slower at naming the colour of gambling stimuli compared to 
naming the colour of neutral stimuli. Furthermore, no such differences would be 
observed in the control group. The results indeed revealed slower colour naming for 
gambling stimuli compared to neutral stimuli only for the Poker players group. This is 
in line with previous research (Boyer & Dickerson, 2003a; Brevers et al., 2011; Cox 
et al., 2006a) and it provides further evidence that addiction related stimuli can 
activate automated processes that can in turn impact attention. 
 Furthermore, Poker players were overall faster in the task compared to non-
players. This could very well be due to an excitation effect caused by an increased 
dopaminergic activity as proposed by Franken (2003). This increased dopaminergic 
activity could lead to an increased arousal that can in turn lead to reduced RT in 
Stroop task (Hogervorst, Riedel, Jeukendrup, & Jolles, 1996; Lambourne & 
Tomporowski, 2010). It should be noted though that without any explicit measures of 
arousal, one should be cautious about this conclusion.  
 The analysis also revealed that for Poker players as RT got bigger so did the 
differences in RT between salient and neutral stimuli, this was not observed in the 
control group. This is general finding in the classic Stroop task as RTs increase 
across quantiles (Kinoshita, de Wit, Aji, & Norris, 2017). This finding provides 
support for the Elaborative Intrusive Theory (Kavanagh et al., 2005) that argues that 
the longer we attend to external cues the more desire and associated thoughts get 
activated, leading to even stronger attentional bias effects.  
  Moreover, there was no fast nor slow effect. Instead, the presence of two 
gambling stimuli was required in order to trigger attentional effects on the third 





has been reported before in addiction-modified Stroop tasks (e.g., Cane et al., 2009; 
Sharma & Money, 2010). The difference here is that the carry-over effect takes place 
only if an additional salient stimulus is presented to reinforce the impact on the 
current stimulus. One possible explanation could be that the Poker players that took 
part in the experiment were not pathological gamblers; however, without such 
measurement this can neither be accepted or rejected. A more plausible explanation 
is the fact that the slow effect is associated with negative emotions (Cane et al., 
2009; Frings et al., 2010). Therefore, the lack of it could be due to the Poker players 
not having developed negative emotions yet towards gambling stimuli. However, this 
could also be due to a limitation of this study that had to do with the fact that Poker 
players did not complete any gambling questionnaires. However, this was 
unavoidable in this case but it should be avoided in future research. 
 
Experiment 2: Facebook and Internet Modified Stroop Task 
 Despite the wealth of research on gambling, other forms on non-substance 
addiction have not been subjected to equal experimental investigations. One such 
under-researched for of non-substance addiction is the Internet addiction (IA). Even 
more so in terms of investigating for attentional bias effects. IA research has mainly 
focused on excessive gaming (R. J. Van Holst et al., 2012), online gaming (Metcalf & 
Pammer, 2011b; Zhou, Yuan, & Yao, 2012b), and online pornography addiction 
(Love, Laier, Brand, Hatch, & Hajela, 2015). Internet addiction though includes many 
more behaviours than the ones mentioned above. Young (1999) proposed five types 
of Internet addiction, computer addiction, information overload, cyber-sexual 
addiction, cyber-relationship addiction, and net compulsion. Moreover, Kuss and 
Griffiths (2011) suggested that excessive use of Facebook or generally Social 
Network Sites (SNS), should be regarded as a separate addiction. Their argument 
relies on the fact that people who use SNS excessively can also display some of the 
addiction criteria such as neglecting personal life or concealing addictive behaviour.  
 Furthermore, the authors originally categorised Facebook addiction as cyber-
relation addiction. However, in the recent years Facebook has evolved to a more 
holistic platform that now incorporates games, transactions, news feeds, advertising, 





now a more general online addiction that includes most of the types that Young has 
proposed. The above, in conjunction with the availability of Facebook on mobile 
phones which makes its potential severity even greater, highlight the need for 
investigating its implications on human behaviour. 
  The current study aimed to look into attentional biases triggered by 
gambling and Facebook/Internet related stimuli and highlight any similarities and 
differences to the gambling addiction. Similarities between the two could provide 
further evidence that non-substance addictions are associated to attentional bias. 
Furthermore, and more interestingly, any potential differences could help formulate 
novel research questions to explore addiction even further. The task used was ,  a 
Facebook/Internet modified Stroop, similar to the gambling modified Stroop in 
Experiment 1.The hypothesis was that participants will be slower at reporting the 
colour of Facebook and Internet related stimuli (salient) compared to neutral stimuli. 
     
Experiment 2: Method 
Participants 
 Seventy-four Psychology students from the University of Kent took part in this 
experiment (8 males and 66 females). Age varied from 18 to 34 (M = 19.20, SD = 
2.00). Participants were recruited via the Kent Psychology RPS website and 
received course credits. 
Design 
 This was a within-subjects design with Image(Facebook, Internet) and 
Salience(Salient, Neutral) as the independent variables and the colour naming 
reaction time (RT) as the dependent variable. 
Materials 
 Hardware and Software. For the temporal bisection task, the images were 
presented on a 19-inch monitor (1,024 x 768, 60Hz) connected to an Intel i5 
powered PC. The software used to present the stimuli and collect the responses was 
Psychopy v1.83 (Peirce, 2009). Standard keyboard and mouse were used to input 





 Visual Stimuli. In total, 20 images were used in this experiment: 5 Facebook 
salient (FS), 5 Facebook matched (FM), 5 Internet salient (IS) and 5 Internet 
matched (IM). Initially, five images related to Facebook were selected and used as 
reference to create five matching images. These matching images had similar 
geometrical features as the five Facebook ones. Similarly, we selected five images 
related to the use of Internet (e.g. email icon) and proceeded with creating five 
matching images as described above. Furthermore, in order to avoid colour saliency 
issues between stimuli all matching images had similar colour and luminosity means. 
This was checked using Photoshop® and independent online tools (e.g. 
http://mkweb.bcgsc.ca/color-summarizer). The dimensions of all images were 300 x 
300 pixels. All of the above images were then converted to 256 greyscale. Adobe 
Photoshop ® was then used to apply four different filters similarly to Exp1. These 
were red (255, 0, 0), green (0, 255, 0), blue (0, 0, 255) and yellow (255, 255, 0) with 
40% opacity. This resulted in a total of 80 images, for detailed stimuli see Appendix 
B.  Furthermore, the” office equipment” stimuli from Exp1 were used during the 
Stroop training phase. 
  Young’s Internet Addiction Test (YIAT). Young’s IAT (1998) was 
used in order to measure the severity of problems caused by the use of Internet. 
This is a 20-item questionnaire (e.g., ‘How often do you find that you stay online 
longer than you intended?’) with five-point Likert scale items 5-point scale: 1, rarely; 
2, occasionally; 3, frequently; 4, often; 5, always (0, not applicable), see Appendix C. 
The items measure the impact of the Internet on sleeping pattern, feelings, social 
life, productivity, and daily routine. Scores can range from 0 to 100 with the author 
suggesting four different severity groups. For scores of 0-30 the use of Internet is 
average and non-problematic, scores of 31-49 mild Internet addiction, 50-79 
moderate Internet addiction, 80-100 severe Internet addiction causing significant 
problems. However, these cut-off points have been arbitrarily selected and are not 
based on empirical evidence (D. J. Kuss, Griffiths, Karila, & Billieux, 2014). An 
alternative cut-off point at 51 has also been proposed by Stavropoulos, Alexandraki, 
and Motti-Stefanidi (2013). The questionnaire has been found to have moderate to 
good internal consistency with Cronbach’s alphas ranging from .54 to .82 (Chang & 
Man Law, 2008; Khazaal & Billieux, 2008). The YIAT was completed online at the 
Qualtrics website (Qualtrics ©, http://www.qualtrics.com, 2015). Similarly, to the 





on the response of their choice. 
 The Compulsive Internet Use Scale (CIUS). The CIUS (Meerkerk, Van Den 
Eijnden, Vermulst, & Garretsen, 2009) is a brief questionnaire designed to assess 
the severity of compulsive Internet use. It contains 14 items (e.g., ‘do you find it 
difficult to stop using the Internet when you are online?’) with a 5-point scale: 0, 
never; 1, seldom; 2, sometimes; 3, often; 4, very often, see Appendix D. Similarly, to 
the paper version, all questions were presented in one block and participants had to 
click on the response of their choice. It has been found to have high internal 
consistency with Cronbach’s alpha at .89 and has been adapted to assess a variety 
of Internet related addictions (Meerkerk et al., 2009; Nele Nyenhuis, 2013). However, 
one of the limitations of this instrument is the lack of cut-off points (D. J. Kuss et al., 
2014). 
 The Facebook Compulsive Internet Use Scale (FCIUS). A modified version 
of the CIUS was used in order to assess the Compulsive Use of Internet. Similar 
questionnaires have been developed in the past by replacing the key terms in the 
questionnaire (e.g., “Internet”) with a more appropriate one (e.g., “World of 
Warcraft”). In this case the new key term was “Facebook” (e.g., ‘do you find it difficult 
to stop using Facebook when you are online?’). For details see Appendix E. 
Procedure 
 The procedure for this experiment was identical to Exp1. The key difference 
was the number of trials during the testing phase. There was a total of 240 trials, 
three repetitions of 80 unique trials that were randomly presented. The task was the 
same as in Exp1, participants had to report the colour of the stimulus, by pressing 
the corresponding key, and ignore the content. This had to be done as quickly and 
accurately as possible. Upon completion of the Stroop task participants had to 
complete the online questionnaires (Qualtrics ©, http://www.qualtrics.com, 2015). 
Experiment 2: Results 
Stroop Data Preparation 
 Prior to the data analysis, the first trial and all other trials with incorrect 
responses for each participant were removed. This resulted in dropping 74 first trials 





responses). Furthermore, all trials with response time outside ±3SD’s based on each 
participant and condition specific mean were also removed. This resulted in dropping 
a further 287 trials leaving 16,489. Finally, any trials with responses faster to 300ms 
were removed which resulted in a final sample that contained 16,446 trials (the 
overall reduction from original sample to final sample was 7.40%). 
Analysis of Errors 
 A two-way analysis of variance for ratio of errors over total trials was 
conducted with Image (Facebook, Internet) and Salience (Salient, Neutral). Both the 
main effects and the interaction were non-significant, all F’s < 2.59 and all p’s > .112.  
Reaction Time Analysis 
 The mean correct reactions times (RT) were entered into a two-way ANOVA 
including Image (Facebook, Internet) and Salience (Salient, Neutral). There was a 
significant main effect of Salience, F(1, 73) = 5.692, p = .020, η2p = .072, with 
observed power (1-β) = .95 (α = .05). This is in line with our hypothesis as it 
indicates higher RTs for Salient stimuli compared to Neutral (Salient: M = 804.33ms, 
SD = 15.71ms; Neutral: M = 789.99, SD = 15.44ms). There was no significant main 
effect of Image, nor a significant Image x Salience interaction (both F’s < 0.532, p > 
.468). 
Fast and Slow Effect Analyses 
 Furthermore, correct reaction times were also analysed in terms of fast 
(current Neutral with previous Neutral vs. current Salient with previous Neutral) and 
slow effects (current Neutral with previous Salient vs. current Neutral with previous 
Neutral). For this purpose, a two-way ANOVAs was ran with Current trial (Neutral, 
Salient) by Previous trial (Neutral, Salient). As expected from the above reaction time 
analysis there was significant main effect of Current trial, F(1, 73) = 5.76, p = .019, η2p 
= .073, with observed power (1-β) = .95 (α = .05). Furthermore, there was a main 
effect of Previous trial, F(1, 73) = 5.67, p = .020, η2p = .072, with observed power (1-
β) = .95 (α = .05), indicating a reinforcing carry over effect when the previous 
stimulus is Salient compared to when the previous is Neutral (Previous Salient: M = 





result suggests that attentional bias effects triggered by the presence of a previous 
Salient stimulus, also known as slow effect.  
Questionnaire Analysis 
 The YIAT scores varied from 5 to 60 (MYIAT = 28.32, SDYIAT =12.33, Cronbach 
α = .912). Twenty-five participants had scores between 30 and 49 and were, and five 
had scores between 50 and 79. There were no participants with scores higher than 
80 that would indicate significant problems due to use of Internet (Young, 1998). The 
CIUS means per participant varied from 1 to 3.93 (MCIUS = 1.9, SDCIUS =0.61, 
Cronbach α = .905). The FCIUS means per participant varied from 1 to 4.21 (MCIUS = 
2.25, SDCIUS =0.65, Cronbach α = .902). Furthermore, correlational analysis was 
carried out between the YIAT, CIUS, FCIUS scores and the attentional bias scores 
(salient –matched) in RT. All correlations between attentional bias scores and each 
of the questionnaires were non-significant (r’s < .124, p’s > .169). As expected the 
questionnaires were highly correlated (all p’s < .001; YIAT-CIUS: r(74) = .78, YIAT-
FCIUS: r(74) = .45, FCIUS-CIUS: r(74) = .54). Finally, in order to see if there were 
any differences between participants who scored high in the questionnaires versus 
participants who scored low, groups were created based on cut-off points for all 
three questionnaires, using a median split. Furthermore, specifically for the YIAT an 
extra cut-off point was created separating participants who scored more than 51 and 
less than 51, this value has been identified as a second potential cut-off point instead 
of 71 (Chang & Man Law, 2008; Khazaal & Billieux, 2008). All the above two-way 
ANOVA’s (Salience, Group) revealed non-significant effects (all F’s < 1, p’s > .367). 
Experiment 2: Discussion 
 The aim of the current experiment was to show that Internet and Facebook 
related stimuli (referred to as salient) could cause attentional bias effects. 
Specifically, the hypothesis was that participants would be slower at responding the 
colour of salient stimuli compared to neutral ones. The results indeed revealed 
slower colour naming for salient stimuli compared to neutral stimuli. Similarly to 
Experiment 1 with the gambling stimuli, this is in line with previous research (Boyer & 
Dickerson, 2003a; Brevers et al., 2011; Cox et al., 2006a) and provides evidence 





a very small number of participants scored moderately high in the addiction 
questionnaires, and group comparison between high scoring and low scoring 
participants revealed non-significant results. One could argue that these results 
should not be attributed to addiction related stimuli and other explanations should be 
sought after. A possible explanation here could be that participants use excessively 
the Internet and Facebook on a daily basis and that has led to related stimuli 
becoming emotionally salient.  
 This emotional impact of Facebook and Internet related stimuli (salient) could 
explain the differences in RT and also the fast and slow effect. Indeed, in Experiment 
2 we had some distinct findings in comparison to Experiment 1. Contrary to 
Experiment 1 where we only had fast effects, in Experiment 2 both slow and fast 
effects were found. This means that the stimuli were salient enough to activate an 
interference process in the colour naming of the current neutral trial (fast effect). 
Furthermore, a previous salient trial can attract one’s attentional resources to the 
extent that a disengagement process is activated affecting the colour naming of 
current neutral trials (slow effect). This provides some initial evidence that Internet 
and Facebook related stimuli can trigger attentional bias even in non-problematic 
users.  
 However, it could be argued that the observed effects, are merely effects of 
familiarity, especially in Experiment 2, as the participant encounter the salient stimuli 
used on a daily basis. This is a plausible argument that future research needs to 
address. A second limitation of this study could have to do with the nature of the 
Stroop task itself. It is ideal for detecting attentional conflicts, and even though some 
of the results hinted possible arousal effects perhaps future research should use 
paradigms more suitable of investigating the role of arousal as well.  
Chapter Conclusion 
 Despite its limitations, this study discovered similarities and differences in 
attentional biases caused by gambling and Facebook/Internet related stimuli. Both 
types of stimuli (gambling, Internet/Facebook) seem to trigger a disengagement 
process that carries over to the trial that follows salient stimuli. More so in the 
Facebook/Internet paradigm as in the gambling one two salient stimuli are required. 





therefore becoming part of our emotional associations, at least to a greater extent 
than the emotional impact of gambling stimuli for the Poker players. Furthermore, in 
the Facebook/Internet paradigm a fast interference effect was observed, but not in 
the gambling paradigm. This could indicate that Facebook/Internet stimuli are highly 





 : THE EFFECTS OF GAMBLING RELATED 
STIMULI ON THE TIME PERCEPTION OF GAMBLERS AND 
NON-GAMBLERS 
 The previous chapter explored whether addiction related stimuli (gambling, 
Internet, Facebook) could cause attentional bias effects. It was found that all three 
types of stimuli could be associated with Stroop effects. However, there were also 
questions on whether arousal effects were also present, in particular for the 
gambling related stimuli. Furthermore, there were indications that gambling related 
stimuli were possibly not perceived as threatening. The aims of this chapter are to 
explore whether gambling related stimuli could be perceived as threatening, and to 
better discern whether such stimuli could have arousal and/or attentional effects. 
Indeed, in chapter 2 we did not detect a Stroop slow effect, indicating that gamblers 
might not have associated gambling stimuli with negative consequences. In order to 
further explore this, we will manipulate the level of perceived threat by presenting 
stimuli associated with different chances of winning or losing. Thus, by manipulating 
the level of threat we aim to explore whether temporal distortions, different for each 
level of threat will appear. 
Experiment 3: Introduction 
 One cognitive model that can predict distinct attentional and arousal effects is 
the internal clock model (ICM) that was originally posited by Gibbon (Gibbon, 1977, 
1991; Gibbon, Church, & Meck, 1984). Gibbon in his scalar expectancy theory (SET) 
proposed a model that involved a clock stage, a memory stage, and a decision stage 
as already detailed in Chapter 1.  
 In brief, to draw the cognitive connections between different clock stages, 
attention, arousal, and memory process I will summarise the ICM. The clock stage 
consists of three components, the pacemaker, the mode switch, and the 
accumulator. The pacemaker is producing pulses at a certain rate that could be 
affected by arousal. The mode switch that allows the pulses to reach the 
accumulator. However, when we get distracted the mode switch switches to off 
resulting in a number of pulses not reaching the accumulator. Therefore, attention is 
a crucial component for the switch to stay on. In the case of external events 





accumulator, which is the next component of the clock stage. The memory stage is 
holding mental representations of past temporal experiences and the comparator in 
the decision stage is assessing to what extent our current temporal experience is 
similar to past ones. 
 This distinct stage approach allows us to isolate individual components which  
are sensitive to context and can result in distorted time perception (Sylvie Droit-Volet 
& Gil, 2009). Indeed, this perceptual distortion is not a result of a faulty clock model 
but more so of the clock’s ability to adjust to current experience. This makes time 
perception a valuable tool in investigating emotion, attention, and arousal effects. 
Specifically, any arousal effects should affect the pacemaker and any attentional 
effects should affect the mode switch. 
 Previous research in time perception has demonstrated that increased 
arousal can directly affect the pacemaker thus resulting in overestimating time 
duration of temporal events (Casini, 2001). Furthermore, a number of researchers 
have demonstrated that arousal, due to negative emotions in particular, can affect 
our time perception (e.g., S Droit-Volet, Fanget, & Dambrun, 2015; Sylvie Droit-Volet 
& Meck, 2007; Kramer, Weger, & Sharma, 2013; Tipples, 2008, 2011; Tipples, Meck, 
Cheng, & Narayanan, 2016). The above findings are suggesting that threatening 
stimuli could elicit negative emotions and that arousal effects could be causing the 
distorted time perception. Mella, Conty, and Pouthas (2011) provided more evidence 
to support this claim by using physiological measures of arousal. Specifically, they 
used skin conductance response (SCR) together with emotional regulation and 
found that participants were perceiving the duration of highly arousing stimuli to last 
longer.  
 Even though Wittman et al. (2007) have demonstrated that participants who 
were dependent on stimulants had impaired time perception no similar research has 
been conducted to investigate the effects on non-addiction related stimuli on time 
perception, especially using the temporal bisection task (TB). With this experiment 
(Experiment 3), I aim to examine whether gambling related stimuli could lead to 
distortions in the perception of time for gamblers. Any potential such findings could 
provide further support to the work discussed in the previous chapter. A further aim 
was to investigate whether the above effects could be due to attentional or arousal 
effects.  





consistently detect distortions in our time perception when we are exposed to salient 
stimuli (Sylvie Droit-Volet, Bigand, Ramos, & Bueno, 2010; Sylvie Droit-Volet & 
Meck, 2007a; Tipples, 2011; Wittmann, Leland, Churan, & Paulus, 2007). 
Participants were either gamblers or non-gamblers and the TB was modified to 
include gambling and non-gambling (neutral) related stimuli. Specifically, poker 
related stimuli were chosen as the gambling stimuli because the participants for the 
gambling group were members of Poker Society at the University of Kent. The 
hypothesis was that gamblers would exhibit distorted time perception, where as non-
gambler would not. Specifically, and following from the findings in Experiment 2, our 
first hypothesis was that gamblers would underestimate time for gambling stimuli 
compared to neutral stimuli (result of attentional effects). Furthermore, the 
overestimation should exist in non-gamblers. Our second hypothesis was that 
gamblers would exhibit better temporal discriminability compared to non-gamblers as 
an effect of increased arousal from being exposed to gambling stimuli. 
   
Experiment 3: Method 
Participants 
 Forty-five participants were recruited for this experiment, 20 for the Poker 
condition (all males, Mage = 20.45, SDage = 4.03) and 25 for the Control condition (six 
males, 17 females, 2 did not disclose gender, Mage = 20.26, SDage = 3.99). All 
participants were students at the University of Kent and were recruited using two 
separate methods. For the Poker condition, the experiment was advertised at the 
Poker Society of the University of Kent and each participant was offered a free entry 
to a Poker tournament with a trophy of £100 to be distributed to the top three 
players. The typical entry to similar tournaments of £100 with a player pool of up to 
30 players is usually £3. For the control condition, the experiment was advertised at 
the RPS website, as mentioned in previous chapters, and each participant was 
awarded 2 credits. The compensations for the two conditions were matched to 
approximate 30 minutes of work. 
Design 





Image (Gambling(G), Neutral(N)) x Duration (400, 600, 800, 1000, 1200, 1400, 
1600ms). Group was a between-subjects factor; Image and Duration were within-
subjects factors. Participants had to report the duration of presented events as either 
long or short. These responses were used to calculate the dependent variable of 
p(long) as the proportion of long responses over the total number of trials. The 
p(long) responses were further used to obtain the Bisection Point (BP) and the 
Weber’s Ratio (WR) psychometrics. More details on BP and WR are provided below 
at the results section. 
Materials 
 Hardware and software. The study was conducted in the labs of the School 
of Psychology where each participant was alone in an individual cubicle. The 
experiment was presented on a Psychology department Dell desktop computer with 
a 19 inches monitor (4:3 factor). The custom computer software used to present the 
stimuli was programmed in Psychopy v1.83 (Peirce, 2007, 2009). 
 Visual stimuli. For this experiment, we used a reduced subset of images 
from Exp1. From all the gambling related stimuli, only the ones directly related to 
Poker were used, together with their Matched Neutral items. This was due to the 
possibility that Poker players might have not been familiar with other gambling 
activities. These resulted in three Gambling stimuli and three Neutral stimuli2. 
 Questionnaires.  
 DSM-IV gambling criteria based scale (APA, 1994). We used a 
questionnaire based on the DSM-IV criteria. This questionnaire was used during 
British Gambling Prevalence Survey in 2007 (for more information on BGPS read 
Orford, Wardle, Griffiths, Sproston, & Erens, 2010). The questionnaire included ten 
items and asked the participant to think of activities and behaviours for the past 12 
months. An example of an item was “Have you needed to gamble with more and 
more money to get excitement you are looking for?”. The response options were 
“never”, “occasionally”, “fairly often”, and “very often”. These options were scored 
with 0, 1, 2, 3 respectively. The first item was asking whether a participant would go 
back another day to win the money they lost. The response options for this item were 
“Every time I lost”, “Most of the time I lost”, “Some of the time I lost”, and “Never”. 
 





These options were scored with 3, 2, 1, 0 respectively. DSM-IV was found to have 
satisfactory internal validity, Cronbach’s α = 0.78 (Orford et al., 2010). For detailed 
items see Appendix F. 
 Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI; Ferris & Wynne, 2001). Similarly 
to the DSM-IV questionnaire, the PGSI was asking participants how often they would 
exhibit a behaviour in the past 12 months. An example of an item was “…have you 
borrowed money or sold anything to get money to gamble?”. The response options 
were “Never”, “Some of the time”, “Most of the time”, “Almost always” and were 
scored with 0, 1, 2, 3 respectively. The PGSI was found to have good internal validity 
during the BGPS, Cronbach’s α = 0.90 (Orford et al., 2010). For detailed items see 
Appendix G. 
 Gambling Craving Scale (GACS) by Young and Wohl (2009). The GACS 
was developed in order to assess craving to gamble. It is a 9-item scale and includes 
three factors. Anticipation, example item “Gambling would be fun right now.” Desire, 
example item “I have an urge to gamble.” Relief, “Gambling would make me less 
depressed.”. Participants had to respond on a 7-point scale (1-strongly disagree to 7-
strongly agree). All three subscales demonstrated good reliability with Cronbach’s    
α = 0.84, α = 0.81, α = 0.85, respectively. For detailed items see Appendix H. 
Procedure 
 Once participants were recruited, they were instructed to arrive at a 
Psychology lab at the University of Kent. After being briefed and providing consent, 
each participant completed the experiment in individual cubicles. The experiment 
was comprised of a temporal durations training phase, a testing phase, and finally a 
questionnaires phase. During the training phase, participants were instructed that the 
first two tasks were training tasks and that the experimenter would stay in the cubicle 
in order to provide further instructions if needed. Participants were told that the 
purpose of the training tasks was to introduce them to the “short” (400ms) and “long” 
(1600ms) standards. This would have provided them with sufficient training to 
discriminate between them 400 and 1600ms.  
 During the first training task, it was explicitly mentioned that a single image 
would be shown over the course of the “short” and “long” standards. The image 
would be presented in a fixed alternating short-long order and that the participant 





response, feedback (“correct” / “incorrect”) was displayed on the centre of the screen 
for 1 second. Consequently, a randomly varying inter-trial interval (0.5s to 1.5s) 
would follow. During the second training task, the same image was presented on the 
screen either for 400ms or 1600ms, but in a random order. The second training task 
lasted until the participant produced eight consecutive correct responses. Again, 
feedback (“correct” / “incorrect”) was provided after each response.  
 Once the second training task was completed, instructions regarding the test 
phase were displayed on the screen. The instructions informed the participants that 
more stimuli would be presented in varying durations and they would have to 
respond whether these durations were closer to “short” or “long”. The experimenter 
would ask the participant if he/she was happy with the instructions and then leave 
the cubicle before the test phase would start. During this task six images (three 
gambling, three neutral) would be presented for seven durations (400, 600, 800, 
1000, 1200, 1400, 1600ms) in random order. This was repeated fort three blocks 
resulting in 126 trials (three blocks of 42 trials each). During the test phase 
participants had to respond “short” or “long” again but with no with no feedback 
following their responses. Once this task was finished participants had to answer the 
experiment questionnaires and then were fully debriefed and thanked for their 
participation. 
 
Experiment 3: Results  
Data Preparation and Analysis  
 Initially the mean proportion of long responses, p(long), was calculated for 
each participant and type of image. Furthermore, probit analysis was used to 
calculate the Bisection Point (BP) and the Weber’s Ratio (WR). The p(long) value is 
calculated as the ratio of “long” responses divided by the total number of responses 
and it is a first indication on whether there was an overestimation or underestimation 
of the time intervals per duration. The BP indicates at which duration each participant 
was crossing the threshold to pressing “long” over “short” response. BPs were 





to .5 or p(50). The WR is a measurement of discriminability and is the ratio of half the 
difference between p(75) and p(25) divided by  p(50), for more details read Droit-
Volet and Rattat (2007). In this case WR indicates the minimum time interval in 
durations that a participant would be able to detect. Therefore, the smaller the WR 
the better a participant would be at detecting smaller changes in durations. 
Furthermore, the BP value was used as an exclusion criterion for filtering out 
participants that were not performing as instructed. Any participants with BP below 
400 or above 1600 were consistently removed in all the experiments and prior to 
carrying out the analysis of variance, as described in (Gonidis & Sharma, 2017). In 
Exp3 four participants, all from the Control Group, were removed for violating the BP 
criterion. One more participant from the Poker Group was removed as he/she did not 
complete the Temporal Bisection task, resulting in 40 participants. 
P(long) Analysis 
 The p(long) values were entered into a three-way analysis of variance 
including Duration (400, 600, 800,1000, 1200, 1400, 1600ms), Image (G, N) and 
Group (Poker, Control). As expected, there was a main effect of Duration, F (1, 38) = 
343.725, p < .001, η2p = .9, with observed power (1-β) = 1.00 (α = .05), indicating that 
participants were significantly reporting higher p(long) as the duration of the stimuli 
increased (Means respectively for 400 to 1600ms: .020, .085, .289, .585, .788, .892, 
.934). There were no other main effects (all F’s < 2.134 and p’s > .152). There was a 
significant Image x Group interaction, F(1, 38) = 11.104, p = .002, η2p = .226, with 
observed power (1-β) = 0.90 (α = .05). Follow-up post-hoc analysis with Bonferroni 
corrections revealed a simple effect of Image for the Poker Group indicating an 
underestimation for the Gambling stimuli (M = .47) compared to the Neutral stimuli 





comparisons will be with Bonferroni correction unless stated otherwise). 
Finally, there was a significant Duration x Group interaction, F (1, 38) = 4.362, p < 
.001, η2p = .103, with observed power (1-β) = 0.99 (α = .05). The two groups 
performed significantly different at 600ms (Poker, M = .043, SD = .025; Control, M = 








Figure 5 p(long) performance for the Poker and control group. Smoothing of the lines was 
carried out by the Excel smooting algorithm (as for the rest of the figures in this thesis). 
BP Analysis 
 The BP values were entered into a two-way analysis of variance including 
Image (G, N) and Group (Poker, Control). There was no main effect of Image, F (1, 
38) = 2.08, p = .158. There was also no main effect of Group, F (1, 38) = 1.74, p = 
.196. However, there was a significant interaction between Image and Group, F (1, 

































Figure 6). Further pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustment revealed a 
significant simple effect of Image for the Poker condition (p = .003, Gambling: M = 
1050.44ms, SD = 136.52ms, Neutral: M = 991.21ms, SD = 138.29ms). There was no 
simple effect of Image in the Control condition (p = .184, Gambling stimuli: M = 
937.55ms, SD = 201.18ms, Neutral stimuli: MN = 960.45ms, SDN = 203.00ms). 
These findings are in line with our hypothesis that Poker players would significantly 
underestimate time for Gambling stimuli compared to Neutral stimuli and no such 
effect would be observed in the Control Group. 
WR Analysis 
 A two-way analysis of variance was carried out on the WR scores including 
Image (G, N) and Group (Poker, Control). There was a main effect of Group,             
F (1, 38) = 4.90, p = .033, η2p = .114, with observed power (1-β) = 0.63 (α = .05), with 
Poker Group participants demonstrating significantly lower WR scores (Poker Group: 
M = .158, SD = 0.08, Control Group:    M = .216, SD = 0.08). There was no main 
effect of Image nor a significant interaction (all F’s < .217 and p’s > .644). These 
findings suggest that Poker players have an overall better time discriminability, which 




























 We calculated the means for the three questionnaires, DSM-IV, PGSI, and 
GACS. Furthermore, we also calculated the means for the three factors of the GACS 
which are Anticipation, Desire, and Relief. The above means were entered in one-
way ANOVA with Group (Poker, Control) being the between factor. There were 
significant main effects of group in DSM-IV: F (1, 39) = 7.584, p = .009, η2 = .17, with 
observed power (1-β) = 0.79 (α = .05); in PGSI: F (1, 39) = 10.759, p = .002, η2 = .22, 
with observed power (1-β) = 0.91 (α = .05); in GACS: F (1, 39) = 8.582, p = .006, η2 = 
.18, with observed power (1-β) = 0.82 (α = .05); in Anticipation: F (1, 39) = 13.001, p 
= .001, η2 = .25, with observed power (1-β) = 0.94 (α = .05),; in Desire: F (1, 39) = 
5.624, p = .023, η2 = .13, with observed power (1-β) = 0.92 (α = .05),. There was no 
main effect of Group in Relief, F (1, 39) = 0.398, p = .532, η2 = .01 (for means and 
standard deviation see table 1). As expected, the Poker Group participnats scored 
significantly higher than the Control Group participants. The only exception was in 
the Relief factor as no significant differences were observed.  
Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations per Questionnaire/Factor and Group 
Table 3-1. Means and Standard Deviations per Questionnaire/Factor and Group 
 
Group 
Questionnaire/Factor Poker Control 
DSM-IV 0.72 (0.33) 0.46 (0.25) 
PGSI 0.65 (0.25) 0.44 (0.16) 
GACS 2.96 (0.74) 2.26 (0.77) 
Anticipation 4.89 (0.67) 3.52 (1.50) 
Desire 1.93 (0.90)  1.39 (0.50) 
Relief 2.07 (0.93) 1.86 (1.14) 
Note. Numbers in brackets represent standard deviation  
Correlational Analysis 
 We calculated the differences in BP and WR indices between Gambling and 
Neutral stimuli. Then in order to investigate for possible relations between the explicit 





analysis for all the above. The results are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Corellations Between Implicit and Explicit Measures 
Table 3-2. Correlations Between Implicit and Explicit Measures 
 









dBP   .246 .285 .285 .406** .292 .390* .305 
dWR     .186 -.063 - .105 -.002 -.244 -.072 
DSM       .916** .547** .428** .550** .346* 
PGSI         .584** .459** .616** .346* 
GACS Overall           .816** .766** .762** 
GACS 
Anticipation             .428** .323* 
GACS Desire               .548** 
GACS Relief                 
Note. Numbers in bold represent the only two significant correlations between implicit and 
explicit measures.  
*p < .05. **p < .01 
 
As expected, the Gambling questionnaires are significantly correlated (DSM, PGSI, 
GACS). Furthermore, dBP significantly correlates with GACS and GACS Desire.  
Experiment 3: Discussion 
 The aim of this experiment was to investigate the effects of gambling related 
stimuli on time perception, specifically on individuals with gambling habits. 
Furthermore, following up from the findings in Chapter 2, we wanted to have a 
greater insight on whether these potential intrusion effects would be due to arousal, 
attention or both.  Our hypotheses were that gamblers would underestimate time for 
gambling stimuli compared to neutral stimuli, whereas non-gamblers would not 
exhibit similar behaviour. The findings from Experiment 3 suggest that gambling 
related stimuli could lead to distorted time perception in gamblers, as predicted by 
the internal clock model.  
 Indeed, gamblers demonstrated higher BP for gambling stimuli compared to 





gambling stimuli compared to neutral stimuli, no such effect was found for non-
gamblers. This underestimation of time could be due to attentional effects associated 
with the salient stimuli as predicted by the mode switch. As participants were 
exposed to salient stimuli, their attention was divided between the temporal 
estimation task and the visual content. This salient information could initiate an 
elaborate intrusion cycle as proposed by Kavanagh et al., (2005). This intrusion 
cycle would open the mode switch resulting in a number of generated pulses being 
lost leading to an underestimation of time. As a result, gamblers exhibited a delayed 
closure of the switch due to attending the gambling content and failing to attend to 
time. This relation between the AB and the elaborate intrusion is also supported by 
the positive association between the difference in BP between gambling and neutral 
stimuli and the overall GACS and Desire scores. As the elaborate intrusion takes 
place, desire thoughts are activated that further reinforce the effects of external cues. 
This strongly suggests that gambling stimuli are associated with attentional bias 
affects in gamblers and further supports our finding in Chapter 2.  
 As mentioned earlier we were also interested in exploring whether the 
interference effects we detected in Chapter 2 were due to attention, arousal, or both. 
The WR analysis results clearly suggest that besides attention related effects we 
also have arousal effects. Indeed, gamblers demonstrated significantly lower WR 
values compared to non-gamblers in both experiments, thus having better temporal 
discriminability. One possible explanation for this enhanced discriminability is 
increased arousal. The calculation for WR incorporates the first and third quartile of 
responding long (first quartile: 25% chance of answering long; third quartile: 75% 
chance of answering long. Lower WR values are associated with steeper gradient 
graphs can be a result of increased arousal. This is in line with previous findings on 
stimuli that can increase our arousal, such as threatening stimuli (Allman et al., 2012; 
Sylvie Droit-Volet & Meck, 2007b; Gil & Droit-Volet, 2012b; Tipples, 2008, 2011; 
Tipples et al., 2016). Furthermore, it supports our claim in Chapter 2 that gamblers’ 
overall smaller RT in the Gambling modified Stroop could have been due to 
increased arousal. 
 In conclusion, with this novel gambling modified TB paradigm we 
demonstrated that gamblers, when exposed to gambling related stimuli can gain 
better temporal discriminability as a result of increased arousal. Moreover, gamblers 





whereas non-gamblers would exhibit very similar temporal perception for both types 
of stimuli. 
Experiment 4: Introduction 
 In the previous experiment we clearly showed that gambling related stimuli 
can distort gamblers’ time perception due to both arousal and attentional effects. 
This adds more detail to our existing findings from Experiment 1 and 2 where the 
Stroop Effects could not discriminate between arousal and attentional effects. Thus, 
already demonstrating that the TB task can provide more insights in the study of 
non-substance addiction than the already applied Addiction modified Stroop Test.  
 However, these temporal distortion effects could be attributed to a number of 
different reasons that could be related to the salient content of the stimuli. Previous 
research on time perception has shown negative and positive stimuli can affect our 
time perception differently. Droit‐Volet, Brunot, and Niedenthal (2004) used the TB 
task in order to investigate participants’ time perception when presented with 
emotional faces. Their findings suggest that there is a greater overestimation of 
durations for angry faces compared to happy or sad. This was attributed to angry 
faces being associated to high arousal compared to low arousal happy and sad 
faces. Contrary, Gable and Poole (2012) have shown that we tend to underestimate 
time when exposed to positive stimuli or having fun with a high approach motivation. 
Furthermore, they argued that approach motivation could be responsible for 
underestimating time more than increased arousal or attention distraction.  
 The above could be of great importance for the study of gambling behaviour 
as it could provide the means to provide experimental evidence on whether gambling 
related stimuli would trigger elaborate intrusion thoughts related past negative 
experiences (e.g., money loss) or related to positive past experiences (e.g., winning 
money). In this experiment (Experiment 4), we seek to find evidence that will 
discriminate between the two types of intrusive thoughts (negative vs positive). A 
sample gamblers and non-gamblers were presented with a poker modified TB. This 
time the stimuli were poker hand combinations and we manipulated the winning and 
losing chances of the participant versus a hypothetical opponent. Our hypothesis 
was that only gamblers would display distorted time perception for the winning and 





anticipated distortions could have been a result of intrusive thoughts (negative or 
positive) or arousal and attentional effects. Specifically, if gamblers would 
overestimate time, it would be due to arousal effects from previous negative 
experiences (perceiving stimuli as threatening). Whereas if they found the 
experience of playing poker, they would underestimate time. We also hypothesised 
that non-gamblers should not display any distortions due to the lack of salience of 
the winning and losing scenarios for non-gamblers.  
Experiment 4: Method 
Participants 
 In total 63 participants were recruited for this experiment (34 Males, 28 
Females, one did not report gender). The average age ranged from 18 to 37 (M = 
21.26, SD = 3.45). For the gambling group, the recruitment took place in Grosvenor 
casino in Coventry during the UK student poker championship (6th to 10th of April, 
2016) and participants were offered £3 for their time (28 Males, 2 Females, M = 
21.72, SD = 1.81). For the control group, the recruitment took place at the University 
of Kent using the Psychology RPS website and participants were rewarded with 2 
RPS course credits for their time (6 Males, 26 Females, M = 20.85, SD = 4.41).  
Design 
 This was a mixed design experiment with Group (Poker, Control) as between-
subjects factor and Hand Outcome (Very Probable Win, Close Win, Tie, Close Loss, 
Very Probable Loss) as within-subjects factor, see Materials for more details. The 
dependent measures were the mean proportion of “long” responses p(long), the 
Bisection Point (BP), and the Weber’s Ratio (WR).  The p(long) value is calculated 
as the ratio of “long” responses divided by the total number of responses and it is a 
first indication on whether we have an overestimation or underestimation of the time 
intervals per duration.  
Materials 
 Visual Stimuli. For the purposes of this experiment a collection of poker 
hands was created. The simulated game was Texas Hold’em Poker, where each 





can be used by all players). The combinations of hands were designed to represent 
different probabilities of win and loss. These combinations were, Very Probable 
Win(VPW): AAsd vs 49ch, KKhc vs 38ds, QQsh vs 28cd; Close Win(CW): 1010hs vs 
AKdd, 77cd vs A9hh, 99dc vs KQss; Tie(T): 55ch vs 55sd, 66hs vs 66dc, 88dc vs 
88sh; Close Loss(CL): AKdd vs 1010hs, A9hh vs 77cd, KQss vs 99dc; Very 
Probable Loss(VPL): 49ch vs AAsd, 38ds vs KKhc, 28cd vs QQsh. For detailed 
expected win/lose probabilities see table 3-3. 
 Questions. Originally the experiment design included the DSM-IV, PGSI, and 
GACS questionnaires. In addition, there were also detailed demographic questions. 
However, due to casino’s request to cause minimal interference to the poker players, 
the design had to be reduced to a 15 minutes experiment. That resulted in removing 
the questionnaires leaving only two questions: “In the field below type in how many 
poker games you play week (both cash and tournaments, online or not).”, “I play 
more than one poker games a week.”. For the first question they simply had to type 
in a number whereas the question was a Likert 5-point scale question (1: Strongly 
Disagree to 5: Strongly Agree). 
 Hand Strength Estimation and Confidence. All the hands from the temporal 
bisection task were also presented, one at a time, at the end of the experiment. This 
time the participants had to answer three questions. First, report the chances of 
winning in percentage, they did that moving a slider from 0% to 100%. Second, 
report their confidence in that % by answering the 5-point Likert scale question “How 
confident are you about your above estimation?”, 1: “Extremely confident” to 5: “Not 
confident at all”. Third, report whether they were feeling excited or intimidated by 
seeing this hand, “To what extent you would feel excited about winning or intimidated 
about losing in the above hand?”. This was also a 5-point Likert scale question, 1: 
“Very excited about winning”, 3: “Neither excited nor intimidated”, 5: “Very 
intimidated about losing”. The purpose of these questions was to check whether the 
hands were perceived as exciting or threatening as intended and whether players 
had a realistic perception of their winning/losing chances.  
Procedure 
 Due to recruiting participants in two different places, procedure differed up to 
the moment of starting the temporal bisection task. In the casino, Poker players were 





in taking part in an experiment that was part of a PhD research. Those who were 
interested were then escorted to a quiet room, were fully briefed and provided their 
consent. Participants at the University of Kent signed up on the RPS system as 
mentioned in the participants section. All participants were informed that they would 
have to complete a computerised task and a number of questions afterwards. The 
first two parts of the computerised task were similar to the temporal bisection training 
as was described in Exp3. The key difference was that the image was presented on 
the left and right of the centre of the screen at the same time, this was done to keep 
the training similar to the test phase that participants would see two images 
presented at the screen at the same time (their hand cards vs their opponent’s 
hand). The instructions remained the same, participants had to report whether the 
duration of the event felt short or long. Next, participants received instructions for the 
test phase. The instructions were “For the next session we would like you to imagine 
that you have moved all in preflop and your opponent has called. Both of you show 
your hands, your hand is on the left side of the screen and your opponent’s on the 
right side. You will then be presented with the two poker hands on the screen, yours 
on the left side, your opponent’s on the right side. This presentation of hands will 
have various durations. However, your task remains the same. Once the images are 
gone you will have to report whether the duration felt as short or long.”. The test 
phase included 105 trials, the 15 hand combinations that were mentioned in the 
materials each presented once per for each duration of 400, 600, 800, 1000, 1200, 
1400, and 1600ms. Upon completion of the test phase participant reported their 
gender and age and completed the questions regarding the hands strength 
estimation and confidence (as mentioned in the relevant materials section).  
Experiment 4: Results 
Data Preparation and Group Differences 
 Based on their BP scores five participants were excluded from the analysis, 
three from the Control Group and two from the Poker Group. Initial analysis of how 
many games per week participants play, revealed three outliers for the Poker group. 
These three participants reported playing 999, 100, and 30 games per week. These 
three values were replaced with the closest higher value that was 10 games a week. 





number of games for the Poker group, F(1, 55) = 50.21, p < .001, η2p = .456, with 
observed power (1-β) = 0.99 (α = .05) (Poker Group: M = 4.38, SD = 3.32, Control 
Group: M = 0.21, SD = 0.60). Furthermore, one participant in the control group 
reported playing three Poker games per week and it was decided to be removed 
from the sample. It should be noted though that analysis was run both including and 
excluding this participant and no significant differences were found.  
Hand Winning Chances, Excitement and Confidence Scores 
 For each participant mean percentages of win were calculated per Hand 
Combination (for a summary see Table 3-3). These were then aggregated per Hand 
Outcome(HO) and were compared between groups and against the Actual %. 
Overall, the Poker group was much more accurate at judging winning odds 
compared to the control group, as one would expect from frequent players. 
Furthermore, excitement and mean confidence scores were calculated per 
participant and HO (for a summary of descriptive statistics see Table 3-3).  
 Excitement Scores Analysis. A two-way ANOVA for HO and Group on 
excitement scores revealed a main effect of HO, F(2, 110) =  26.12, p  <  .001,  η2p = 
.303, with observed power (1-β) = 0.99 (α = .05), indicating that participants were 
significantly more excited for the VPW hands (p < .001) compared to the TIE and 
VCL hands (VPW: M = 2.17, SD = 0.90; TIE: M = 3.07, SD = 0.69; VCL: M = 2.94, 
SD = 0.76, lower scores correspond to higher excitation). Furthermore, there were 
no significant differences between the excitement levels of TIE and VCL. Finally, 
there was no main effect of Group, nor a significant interaction of Hand by Group 
(F’s < 1.64, p’s > .198). 
 Confidence Scores Analysis. A two-way ANOVA for HO and Group on 
confidence scores revealed a main effect of HO, F(2, 110) = 3.26, p  = .042,  η2p = 
.052, with observed power (1-β) = 0.67 (α = .05). Pairwise comparisons revealed that 
VPW cards were signicantly judged less confidently compared to VCL cards, p = 
.013. TIE cards confidence estimations were not significantly different to any of the 
other two HO (VPW: M = 3.49, SD = 0.91; TIE: M = 3.36, SD = 1.2; VCL: M = 3.15, 
SD = 0.93, lower scores correspond to higher confidence). There was also a 
significant main effect of Group, F(1, 55) = 32.24, p <  .001,  η2p = .389, with observed 





compared to the Control Group (Poker: M = 3.84, SD = 0.85; Control: M = 2.83, SD = 
0.91 There was also a significant interaction of HO by Group, F(2, 110) =  6.09, p  = 
.003,  η2p = .092, with observed power (1-β) = 0.74 (α = .05). Further pairwise 
comparisons between HO for each Group revealed that Confidence estimations of 
VPW were siginificantly different to TIE and VCL for the Control Group (p’s < .23) 
(TIE and VCL were not significantly different). There were no significant differences 
in the Confidence estimations for the Poker Group (see Table 3-3). Furthermore, 
pairwise comparisons between Groups for each HO revealed that the two Groups 
differed significantly in their Confidence estimations in each HO (p’s < .25, see Table 
3-3). Interestingly, the Control Group was reporting higher confidence across all HO. 
This could be an indication of Poker players putting more thought in judging winning 
outcomes or Control players judging more naively due to lack of expertise.  
HP(long) Analysis Including All Five HO 
 The p(long) values were entered into a three-way analysis of variance 
including Duration (400, 600, 800,1000, 1200, 1400, 1600ms), HO (VPW, CW, TIE, 
CL, VPL) and Group (Poker, Control). As expected, there was a main effect of 
Duration, F (6, 366) = 488.48, p < .001, η2p = .89, with observed power (1-β) = 0.99 (α 
= .05) indicating that participants were significantly reporting higher p(long) as the 
duration of the stimuli increased (Means respectively for 400 to 1600ms: .038, .127, 
.341, .634, .825, .887, .918). There was also a significant Duration by Group 
interaction, F(6, 1344) = 2.44, p = .025, η2p = .04, with observed power (1-β) = 0.99 (α 
= .05). Pairwise comparisons revealed that the two Groups were only significantly 
different at 800ms, p = .011 (Poker: M = .220, SD = .02; Control: M = .352, SD = .02 
, for more details see Figure 7). All other main effects and interactions were non-







Figure 7. Duration by Group Interaction: Including p(long) mean values per duration and 





Table 3-3. Objective and subjective % of win per hand, confidence, and excitation scores per group 
  % of Win Confidence***  Excitement-Intimidation****  
Hand 
Outcome Hand Combination Actual  
Group Group Group 
Poker  Control Poker  Control Poker Control 
VPW 
AAsd vs 49ch 86.81 83.93 74.42* 3.72 3.30 2.07 2.21 
KKhc vs 38ds 86.94 85.14 75.42* 3.79 3.30 2.00 2.24 
QQsh vs 28cd 86.83 85.03 73.73* 3.72 3.09 2.00 2.48 
Tie 
55ch vs 55sd 2.16 17.86** 47.52* 4.10 2.73 3.10 2.94 
66hs vs 66dc 2.17 19.93** 46.82* 4.00 2.82 3.24 2.91 
88dc vs 88sh 2.17 17.97** 43.94* 4.10 2.39 3.10 2.94 
VCL 
AKdd vs 1010hs 45.92 48.17 57.76* 3.72 2.58 3.03 2.91 
A9hh vs 77cd 46.36 46.90 56.88* 3.72 2.48 2.93 2.91 
KQss vs 99dc 47.42 47.59 60.27* 3.69 2.73 3.00 2.85 
*Control group predictions of % of win significantly differed from both the Actual % and from the Poker group predictions 
**Poker group predictions of % of win differed significantly from the Actual % only for the Tie hands 
***Higher scores indicate higher uncertainty/lower confidence 






BP and WR Analysis All Five HO 
 Similarly, to Experiment 3 the BPs were calculated and the entered in to a 
two-way ANOVA including HO (VPW, CW, TIE, CL, VPL) and Group (Poker, 
Control). There were no main effects of HO or Group and the interaction was non-
significant, all F’s < 1.27, p’s > .263. For descriptive statistics see Table 3-4. These 
results indicate that there were no time perception differences for the two groups. 
 Furthermore, the WR scores were also entered in to a two-way ANOVA 
including HO (VPW, CW, TIE, CL, VPL) and Group (Poker, Control). There was no 
significant main effect of HO nor a significant interaction both F’s < .16, p’s > .91. 
There was however, a significant main effect of Group, F(1, 56) = 4.90, p =.031, η2p = 
.08, with observed power (1-β) = 0.88 (α = .05). With the Poker Group demonstrating 
better temporal discriminability (M = .145, SD = .01) compared to the Control Group 
(M = .183, SD = .01). This could be an indication of increased arousal effect, as it will 
be discussed further in the following experiment discussion. 
 
Table 3-4. BP and WR means and standard deviations 
 
Poker Control Overall 


































































*Numbers in brackets represent standard deviations. 
 
Experiment 4: Discussion 
 With this experiment we wanted to investigate whether positive and negative 
potential outcomes could have different effects on gamblers’ time perception. 
Previous research has stated that in the presence of negative stimuli we tend to 





we tend to underestimate time (Gable & Poole, 2012). Our hypothesis was that 
gamblers would overestimate time due to arousal effects from previous negative 
experiences, or they would underestimate time if they would have predominantly 
positive thoughts about playing poker. 
 We attempted to detect such differences by using different Poker Hand 
combinations and manipulating their potential winning and losing outcomes. This 
was done under the assumption that losing hands would trigger negative thoughts 
(high arousal and attentional distraction) and winning hands would trigger positive 
thoughts (increased excitation). However, p(long) and BP analysis did not reveal any 
difference in the time perception between positive and negative outcomes, despite 
the fact that Poker players were successful in estimating the chances of winning or 
losing. This means Poker players were aware of the different outcomes in terms of 
winning or losing but these different outcomes did not trigger negative or positive 
intrusive thoughts. 
 One could argue that these null effects could be explained by Tiffany's 
cognitive processing model (1990). Tiffany suggested that when we are exposed to 
addiction related stimuli then an automatic cognitive process of craving is set in 
motion that can lead to attentional bias. This can happen regardless of positive or 
negative associations with the stimuli. Some support for this claim comes from our 
WR analysis where again gamblers displayed better time discriminability (lower WR 
compared to non-gamblers). Thus, in the presence of gambling related stimuli an 
automatic cognitive process of craving was initiated that resulted in increased 
arousal. Further support to that argument comes from Franken's theory (2003) 
stating that addiction related stimuli can increase dopamine levels. Finally, there is 
the possibility that floor and ceiling effects in p(long) values for short and long 
durations respectively could result in null findings. 
 However, the question remains on why we did not also see differences 
between positive and negative outcomes. One other explanation could be that 
gamblers could be equally desensitised for both positive and negative stimuli. This 
means that they do perceive them as addiction related stimuli but without attributing 
them with positive or negative valence. This seems to be the most plausible 
explanation given that we failed to observe any BP and WR differences between 
positive and negative stimuli. A similar finding was reported by Hudson et al. (2017) 





stimuli but not for negative or positive stimuli. Furthermore, Zack and Poulos (2004) 
found no differences in RT in reading speed between negative and positive affect. 
They did however find significant differences between gambling and neutral words, 
suggesting that gamblers focus on the gambling content and not the type of affect. 
 Finally, two important limitations of this experiment should be highlighted. 
First, the data collection took place in two different places (casino vs lab). This could 
have played an important role in Poker players behaviour as they most probably 
were in a gambling state of mind compare to the participants in the control group 
who were not exposed in such environment. Second, the time restriction imposed 
limited the duration of the experiment resulting in a reduced number of 
measurements that could have provided better insights. 
 
Chapter Conclusion 
 In conclusion, in this chapter we added to the knowledge of addiction related 
attentional effects. We provided support for the internal clock model and we did 
discriminate between attentional and arousal effects, when comparing gamblers to 
non-gamblers in Experiment 3. Our findings also have shed some light on whether 
gamblers can perceive gambling related stimuli as threatening or not, with evidence 
pointing towards the direction that gamblers do not discriminate between positive 
and negative stimuli. This can have implications on designing gambling 
interventions, as gamblers may be “immune” to negative thoughts when presented 
with gambling cues. However, due to limitations in Experiment 4 our findings need to 
be replicated to strengthen our confidence in said results. It is therefore important to 
include a variety of positive and negative stimuli, related and non-related to gambling 
and ideally combine them with physiological measurements that will allow us to 






 : REPETITION, PRIMING, AND FAMILIARITY 
EFFECTS  
 Four experiments will be discussed in this chapter. With Experiment 5, we 
aimed in replicating the attentional and arousal effects we observed for the gambling 
related stimuli but this time using Facebook and Internet related stimuli. Furthermore, 
we employed five blocks with one-minute breaks between blocks, as we also wanted 
to investigate how repetitive testing would affect time perception. With Experiments 6 
and 7, we aimed to replicate the findings from Experiment 5 but also investigate 
whether priming would further affect our findings. Therefore, in Experiment 6, we 
divided our participants in two groups. One group accessed their Facebook account 
only after Block 1 and the second group accessed their Facebook account in all four 
breaks. In Experiment 7, we focused on only two Blocks and employed three 
different priming conditions involving seven minutes tasks. Finally, with Experiment 
8, we wanted to explore whether the salience effects on time perception were due to 
familiarity or emotional content of the stimuli. Therefore, we employed a Temporal 
Bisection task where we replaced the images with associated non-words. 
 
 
 Internet addiction (IA) emerged during the last 20 years with the introduction 
of the web, and has since seen a constantly increasing prevalence (e.g. Kuss, 
Griffiths, & Binder, 2013; Kuss & Griffiths, 2011). Traditionally, addiction was strictly 
associated with the abuse of a substance, such as alcohol, nicotine, or other drugs. 
This association required the presence of a substance that would be associated with 
an uncontrolled urge to use, withdrawal symptoms, or relapse. However, in the 
presence of non-substance related addictive behaviours the study of addiction 
shifted from the classical view to a more holistic biopsychological perspective 
(Griffiths, 2005). Griffiths (1996) proposed that all addictions consist of seven 
components (salience, mood modification, tolerance, withdrawal, conflict, and 
relapse). This allowed us to focus on addictive behaviours and not necessarily 
substances, behaviours such as pathological gambling or Internet addiction. 
Contrary perhaps to most substance addictions, IA is an umbrella term that can 
include a number of different addictive behaviours. This was apparent even from the 





These were computer addiction, information overload addiction, net compulsion 
addiction, cyber-sexual addiction, and cyber-relationship addiction. This 
categorisation is very important as different factors can affect different IA types. For 
example, a form of information overload addiction could be the urge to surf the 
Internet in constant search for new information, whereas, a form of cyber-relationship 
addiction could be an addiction to social networks such as Facebook. Furthermore, 
researchers have found that excessive Facebook users exhibit a number of addiction 
criteria such as thought withdrawal symptoms and mood swings when they cannot 
access Facebook (for a review see Kuss & Griffiths, 2011).  
 Despite the fact that IA shares similarities with substance addictions, the 
majority of the research focuses on the prevalence of use, personality traits, 
motivation and correlational research. To the knowledge of the authors the amount 
of research that focuses on implicit phenomena such as attentional bias or arousal in 
IA is rather limited. The same cannot be said for substance addictions where 
attentional bias has been well researched and is a robust finding, examples among 
others include research on alcohol (Sharma, Albery, and Cook, 2001), nicotine 
(Ehrman et al., 2002), cannabis (Cane, Sharma, and Albery, 2009), cocaine 
(Copersino et al., 2004), heroin (Waters, Marhe, and Franken, 2012), and opioids 
(Lubman et al., 2000); for a review see Cox, Fardadi and Pothos (2006).  
Furthermore, attentional bias has also been researched on Pathological Gambling 
(e.g. Molde et al., 2010; Brevers et al., 2011). 
 This limited research highlights the need for more investigation on IA and 
implicit measures, especially if we consider the first two components that Griffith 
proposed, salience and mood modification. IA salience could refer to raising the 
activity of “being online” as the predominant thought and preoccupation throughout 
the day. This could lead to craving to go online and consistent with addiction theories 
could initiate a vicious circle between craving and attentional bias (Franken, 2003; 
Kavanagh, Andrade, and May, 2005). Furthermore, mood modification could result in 
arousal changes that can lead to increased dopaminergic activity that can further 
enhance the activation of IA related cues and the urge to go online. 
 This highlights the possibility that IA, through dopaminergic activity triggered 
by the presence of salient stimuli, could affect time perception. The effects of 
dopamine in time perception have been demonstrated in a number of studies (e.g., 





2016). Dopamine has been thought to affect arousal which in the internal clock 
models can affect the rate of the pulses generated by the pacemaker (Buhusi & 
Meck, 2002, 2005). However, studies that compare Parkinson’s disease (PD) 
patients to neurologically healthy groups are reporting mixed results, in the best 
case, or even non-significant differences (Wearden et al., 2008; Wearden et al., 
2009). Therefore, investigating time perception in non-substance addiction could be 
informative for both time perception and addiction models as it could provide further 
evidence for the role of dopamine. 
 Moreover, using time perception paradigms could provide implicit 
measurements of the effects of IA in our internal clock, especially since arousal and 
attention are factors that affect its accuracy. One of the most popular internal clock 
models is the one proposed by the scalar timing theory (Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon et al., 
1984). This model consists of three distinct stages, the clock stage, the memory 
stage, and the decision stage. In the clock stage, a pacemaker is generating pulses 
throughout the duration of an event; a mode switch is either allowing the pulses to be 
carried to the accumulator or not. In simple terms, when our attention is focused on 
the event then the mode switch stays on and the generated pulses gather in the 
accumulator. When we are distracted, mode switch could be turned off disallowing 
the pulses from reaching the accumulator. The comparator then compares the 
accumulator content to the memory component content in order to determine 
whether the experienced event felt shorter or longer to the memory stored event, for 
more details see Droit-Volet and Gil (2009). 
 A number of studies have provided evidence that the use of drugs that affect 
arousal can impact our time perception. This is thought to be mainly by influencing 
the pacemaker, thus affecting the rate at which pulses are generated (Drew et al., 
2003; Cheng et al., 2007). Furthermore, negative stimuli can accelerate the 
pacemaker and lead to temporal overestimation compared to positive or neutral 
stimuli (e.g., Droit-Volet and Meck, 2007; Tipples, 2008; Tipples, 2011). In addition, 
attention can also have an impact on our time perception (Thomas & Weaver, 1975; 
Zakay & Block, 1996). Attending to a distractor and not to time would result in the 
mode switch switching off thus not allowing the generated pulses to reach the 
accumulator. This would lead to fewer pulses being accounted thus perceiving the 
event as shorter (temporal underestimation). Attentional bias effects could result in 






Experiment 5: Introduction 
 Attention effects on the internal clock are not limited to merely attentional bias. 
Another factor that could affect our mode switch is the attentional resources 
available to time (Sylvie Droit-Volet, Bigand, Ramos, & Bueno, 2010; Thomas & 
Weaver, 1975). Additionally, Hansen and Trope (2013) have suggested that the 
amount of the attentional resources available to time could depend on our mind-set. 
Their findings suggest that when we are primed with a concrete mind-set less 
attentional resources are allocated to time leading to a shorter experience of time. 
Contrary, when we are primed with an abstract mind-set more attentional resources 
are allocated to time leading to a longer experience of time. This could help us 
distinguish even more between the effects of different stimuli in IA. One could argue 
that by using general Internet related stimuli we are primed with a more abstract 
mind-set since the Internet is a collection of a number of different activities. On the 
other hand, using Facebook related stimuli we are primed with a more concrete 
mind-set since Facebook has more specific and detailed uses compared to the 
Internet as a whole. 
 This experiment is the first to investigate the effects of internet salient stimuli 
on time perception. We used the temporal bisection task to investigate predictions 
from the internal clock model for Internet salient stimuli. If salient stimuli elicit 
intrusive cognitions, then this could be due to attention and/or arousal. The internal 
clock model predicts that if the effects are due to attention, we should have an 
underestimation of time durations leading to a change in the subjective point of 
equality (also known as the bisection point). If the effects are due to arousal, we 
should expect differences in our time perception discriminability, which can be 
reflected in changes in Weber’s ratio (Sylvie Droit-Volet & Meck, 2007). Therefore, 
we hypothesised that salient stimuli, compared to neutral stimuli will lead to distorted 
time perception due to effects on attention and/or arousal. 
Experiment 5: Method 
Participants 





were recruited via the Kent Psychology RPS website for course credit. The mean 
age was 20 with a standard deviation of 5.12 (age ranged from 18 to 44). All 
participants had to be over 18 years old and have a Facebook® account in order to 
participate. 
Design 
 The experiment employed a 2x2x5x7 within participants design: Image 
(Facebook, Internet) x Salience (Salient, Neutral) x Block (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) x Duration 
(400, 600, 800, 1000, 1200, 1400, 1600ms) being the IVs. The dependent measures 
were the mean proportion of “long” responses p(long), the Bisection Point (BP), and 
the Weber’s Ratio (WR).   
Materials 
 Visual Stimuli. In total, 20 images were used in this experiment: 5 Facebook 
salient (FS), 5 Facebook matched (FM), 5 Internet salient (IS) and 5 Internet 
matched (IM). Initially, we selected five images related to Facebook and proceeded 
with creating five matching images. These matching images had similar geometrical 
features as the five Facebook ones. Similarly, we selected five images related to the 
use of Internet (e.g. email icon) and proceeded with creating five matching images 
as described above. Furthermore, in order to avoid colour saliency issues between 
stimuli all matching images had similar colour and luminosity means. This was 
checked using Photoshop® and independent online tools (e.g. 
http://mkweb.bcgsc.ca/color-summarizer). Furthermore, a neutral image was 
selected to be used in the two training tasks. The dimensions of all images were 300 
x 300 pixels. 
 Hardware and Software. For the temporal bisection task, the images were 
presented on a 19-inch monitor (1,024 x 768 resolution, 60Hz refresh rate frequency) 
connected to an Intel i5 powered PC. The software used to present the stimuli and 
collect the responses was Psychopy v1.82 (Peirce, 2009). Standard keyboard and 
mouse were used to input responses and all images were presented in grey 
background. 
 Young’s Internet Addiction Test (YIAT). Young’s IAT (1998) was used in 
order to measure the severity of problems caused by the use of Internet. This is a 





you intended?’) with five-point Likert scale items 5-point scale: 1, rarely; 2, 
occasionally; 3, frequently; 4, often; 5, always (0, not applicable). For more details 
see Chapter 2 Exp2 Materials or Appendix C.  
Procedure 
 After being briefed and providing consent, each participant completed the 
experiment in individual cubicles. The experiment was comprised of two training 
tasks, one main task of five blocks with 140 trials each, followed by completion of the 
online version of the YIAT questionnaire. Participants were instructed that the first 
two tasks were training tasks and that the experimenter would stay in the cubicle in 
order to provide further instructions if needed. Participants were told that the purpose 
of the training tasks was to introduce them to the “short” (400ms) and “long” 
(1600ms) standards and also to provide them with sufficient training to discriminate 
between them. During the first training it was explicitly mentioned that the single 
image would be shown over the course of the “short” and “long” standards. The 
image would be presented in a fixed alternating short-long order and that the 
participant would have to respond “short” (by pressing “s”) or “long” (by pressing “l”). 
After each response, (“correct” / “incorrect”) feedback was displayed on the centre of 
the screen for 1 second. Consequently, a randomly varying intertrial interval (0.5s to 
1.5s) would follow. During the second training task, the same image was presented 
on the screen either for 400ms or 1600ms, but in a random order. The second 
training task lasted until the participant produced eight consecutive correct 
responses. Again, feedback was provided after each response. Once the second 
task was completed the instructions about the main task were presented on the 
screen. The instructions informed that more stimuli would be presented in varying 
durations and they would have to respond whether these durations were closer to 
“short” or “long”. The experimenter would ask the participant if he/she was happy 
with the instructions and then leave the cubicle before the main task started. During 
this task 20 images would be presented for seven durations (400, 600, 800, 1000, 
1200, 1400, 1600ms) in random order, this resulted in 140 trials. The participant 
responded “short” or “long” with no feedback following responses. Upon the 
completion of one block there was a break of one minute before the next block. 
Finally, once the temporal bisection task was finished, the online YIAT questionnaire 





Experiment 5: Results  
P(long) Analysis 
 The p(long) values were entered into a four-way within-participants analysis of 
variance including Image (F, I), Salience(S, M),  Block (1-5), and Duration (400, 600, 
800, 1000, 1200, 1400, 1600ms). There was a main effect of Image, F(1, 34) = 
6.334, p = .017, η2p = .157, with observed power (1-β) = 0.68 (α = .05), indicating an 
underestimation of time for the Facebook images compared to the Internet images 
(respective p(long) means: .606 and .617). There was a main effect of Block, F (4, 
134) = 13.173, p < .001, η2p = .279, with observed power (1-β) = 0.99 (α = .05), 
indicating that participants overestimated time more as we moved from Block 1 to 5 
(respective p(long) means: .556, .588, .624, .636, .656). Furthermore, Block 1 was 
not significantly different from Block 2, however they were both significantly different 
from Block 3, 4, and 5. Finally, there was no significant difference after Block 3 
suggesting that perhaps a peak in p(long) responses had been reached. There was 
also a main effect of Duration, F (6, 204) = 543.591, p < .001, η2p = .940, with 
observed power (1-β) = 0.99 (α = .05), indicating as expected that the p(long) values 
would increase as the time duration increased (respective means for 400 to 1600ms: 
.041, .178, .481, .755, .903, .950, and .974). Furthermore, there was a Salience by 
Duration interaction, F(1,34) = 3.60, p = .002, η2p = .096, with observed power (1-β) = 
0.95 (α = .05). Simple main effects of Salience showed significant effects at 
durations 800ms (p = .024), 1400ms (p = .009), and 1600ms (p = .041), indicating an 
underestimation of time at 800ms for Salient stimuli compared to Neutral stimuli, and 
an overestimation of time at 1400ms and 1600ms for Salient stimuli compared to 
Neutral stimuli. 
 There was also a significant Block by Duration interaction, F(1,34) = 6.96, p < 
.001, η2p = .170, with observed power (1-β) = 0.99 (α = .05). There were significant 
simple main effects of Block at durations 400ms, 600ms, 800ms, and 1000ms (all F’s 
> 2.83, all p’s < .036) but not 1200ms and 1400ms (all F’s < 1, p > .5).  Although 
there was a simple main effect of Block at duration 1600ms, further post-hoc t-tests 
did not reveal any significant differences. At duration 400ms Block 5 was significantly 
different from all other Blocks (all p’s < .014). At duration 600ms, 800ms and 





see Figure 8. 
 Finally, there was a significant Image by Salience interaction, F(1, 34) = 4.87, 
p = .034. There was a significant simple main effect of Salience for Facebook images 
(p = .042) but not Internet images (p = .324). There was also a significant simple 
effect of Image for Salient stimuli (p = .003), see Figure 9 
 
 
Figure 8. P(long) ratio of responses per duration and block indicate a tendency to overestimate time 







Figure 9. Image by Salience interaction indicating an overall underestimation of time for Facebook 
salient compared to Facebook matched and Internet salient. 
 
BP Analysis 
 A three-way within-participants ANOVA including Image(2), Salience(2), and 
Block(5) was carried out. During the probit analysis for the calculation of BP, a 
number of participants had BP outside the 400 – 1600ms range. These participants 
were excluded from all analyses resulting in a final number of 35 participants in the 
analysis. There was a main effect of Image, F(1,34) = 4.46, p = .042, η2p = .116, with 
observed power (1-β) = 0.54 (α = .05), indicating that Facebook related stimuli had a 
higher BP. There was a main effect of Block, F(4,136) = 12.57, p < .001, η2p = .270, 
with observed power (1-β) = 0.99 (α = .05), indicating that BPs were significantly 
reducing from Blocks 1 to 5 (respectively  924.26ms, 877.40ms, 827.10ms, 
810.18ms and 776.94ms) with no significant difference between Blocks 1 and 2 but 
these were both significantly different from Blocks 3, 4 and 5. There was no main 
effect of Salience F(1,34) = 1.05, p = .31.  
 There was a significant interaction between Image and Salience, F(1, 34) = 





effect analysis of Salience within Facebook images (FS=858ms, FM=841ms, p = 
.036) was significant but not for Internet images (IS=832ms, IM=839ms, p = .293).  
No other interactions were significant (all F’s<2.3, p>.07). 
WR Analysis 
 A three-way within-participants analysis of variance including Image(2), 
Salience(2), and Block(5) was carried out. There was a main effect of Salience, F(1, 
35) = 16.39, p < .001, η2p = .324, with observed power (1-β) = 0.98 (α = .05), 
indicating that salient stimuli had significant lower WR (0.167) than matched images 
(0.189), indicating participants were better able to discriminate changes in time 
durations for salient images compared to their matched image. No other main effect 
or interaction were found. It is however worth noting that even though the main effect 
of Block was non-significant (p = .162) the WR means showed a trend of reduced 
discriminability as participants progressed from Block 1 to Block 5 (respectively: 
0.185, 0.202, 0.213, 0.239, 0.262). 
YIAT Score and Correlations 
 The YIAT scores varied from 23 to 73 (MYIAT = 45.01, SDYIAT =10.74). Twenty-
three participants had scores between 30 and 49 and were classified as average 
online users, 16 had scores between 50 and 79 and were classified as online users 
with frequent problems due to Internet use. There were no participants with scores 
higher than 80 that would indicate significant problems due to use of Internet (Young, 
1998).  Furthermore, we ran correlational analysis between the YIAT scores and the 
attentional bias scores (salient –matched) in BP and WR for each image type in each 
block. All correlations were non-significant (r’s < .243, p’s > .114). 
 
Experiment 5: Discussion 
The aim of this experiment was to investigate the effects of Facebook and 
Internet salient stimuli on time perception. We employed a modified temporal 
bisection task and looked into possible effects of salient stimuli on the predictions of 
the internal clock due to either attention, arousal, or both. The internal clock model 





time duration due to distraction. However, arousal can have bidirectional effects 
either by accelerating or decelerating the pulse maker, leading to distorted time 
perception (e.g. Droit-Volet, Fanget, & Dambrun, 2015; Tipples, 2008). 
Our data provided support for attentional effects as predicted by a mode 
switch in the internal clock model. This was supported consistently across by two 
results: the main effects of Block and Image. As Block increased BP decreased 
suggesting an overestimation of time. This lengthened time experience could be a 
result of reduced attention allocated on stimuli caused by this repetitive exposure, 
hence leaving more attentional resources devoted to time. Another explanation for 
this effect could be in terms of boredom and that participants could lose interest in 
looking at the stimuli (Matthews, 2011).  
With regards to Image, there were higher BP scores for Facebook than 
Internet stimuli. This indicates an underestimation of time for Facebook stimuli than 
Internet stimuli suggesting greater attentional resources being allocated to Facebook 
than Internet stimuli. This highlights greater attentional bias due Facebook salient 
stimuli over Internet salient stimuli and no difference between the matched ones. 
This is a very interesting finding underlining perhaps differences between behaviours 
within the IA itself. This could provide further support to arguments that there are 
different behaviours and motivation behind different types of IA as were first 
identified by Young (1999). For example, an IA that is driven by net compulsion or 
cyber-sexual addiction could be driven by the need to surf the web in search of news 
and thus be more associated to excitation and arousal (Cooper, Putnam, Planchon, 
& Boies, 1999). On the other hand an IA that has cyber-relationship addiction in its 
core (the use of Facebook has been identified as such, Kuss and Griffiths, 2011) 
could have more emotional motives and thus perceive Facebook salient stimuli as 
not threatening and not trigger arousal effects that are associated with 
overestimations (e.g. Tipples, 2008, 2011). 
A different explanation on why Facebook stimuli cause different effects than 
the Internet ones could lie in the effects they have on our mind-set. Hansen and 
Trope (2013) have hypothesised that placing ourselves in an abstract or concrete 
mind-set can affect our time perception. This is due to the fact that concrete mental 
representations (one that focuses more on specific details) take up more attention 





a more specific form of IA. Thus, Facebook stimuli might prime a more concrete 
mind-set than Internet stimuli.  
 Our findings also support arousal effects on the pacemaker within the internal 
clock model. The differences in WR scores between salient and matched stimuli 
suggest that our discriminability for salient stimuli remains better across all blocks 
compared to the matched ones. This could mean that salient stimuli are associated 
with higher arousal levels compared to matched neutral ones, resulting in more 
pulses being generated by the pacemaker; hence experiencing time as longer when 
we see salient stimuli compared to matched. This finding is in line with predictions 
from addiction models that addiction related cues can lead to craving and excitation 
and thus increased arousal (Franken, 2003; Kavanagh et al., 2005).  
  
Experiment 6: Introduction 
 At the time that Experiment 5 was conducted it was the first that investigated 
attentional bias effects of Internet and Facebook related stimuli (salient) on our time 
perception. It was therefore vital that we replicated the experiment in order to see if 
we would arrive to the same conclusions regarding the attention and arousal effects 
on our internal clock when viewing salient stimuli. Experiment 6 was a close 
replication of Experiment 5 with one key difference. Participants were allocated to 
one of two groups where they had to access their Facebook account in their mobile 
phones during each break between blocks or access their Facebook account only 
during the first break between blocks 1 and 2. This allowed to better control what 
participants did during their first break and see whether we would get similar results 
to Experiment 5 with regards to block 1 and 2 temporal distortion effects. 
Furthermore, it allowed us to investigate whether accessing Facebook on each break 
would change the fatigue effect we observed in Experiment 5 where temporal 
distortions disappeared after the second block. Our hypothesis was that salient 
stimuli will cause temporal distortions similar to the Experiment 5 ones, at least 
during the first two blocks. Our second hypothesis was that the temporal distortions 
will continue for all blocks only for the participants assigned to access their Facebook 





Experiment 6: Method 
Participants 
 Eighty-four University of Kent psychology students (70 females, 14 males) 
were recruited via the Kent Psychology RPS website for course credit. The mean 
age was 19.83 with a standard deviation of 3.85 (age ranged from 18 to 41). 
Participants had to be over 18 years old and have a Facebook® account in order to 
participate. 
Design 
 The experiment employed a 2x2x2x5x7 mixed design. Image (Facebook, 
Internet) x Salience (Salient, Neutral) x Block (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) x Duration (400, 600, 
800, 1000, 1200, 1400, 1600ms) were the within-subjects the IVs and Group (First 
Break, All Breaks) was the between-subjects IV. The dependent measures were the 
mean proportion of “long” responses p(long), the Bisection Point (BP), and the 
Weber’s Ratio (WR). 
Experiment 6: Results3 
P(long) Analysis 
 The p(long) values were entered into a five-way within-participants analysis of 
variance including Image, Salience, Block, Duration, and Group. There was a main 
effect of Block, F(4, 268) = 5.21, p < .001, η2p = .072, η2p = .096, with observed power 
(1-β) = 0.97 (α = .05), indicating that participants overestimated time as they 
progressed from Block 1 to 5 (respective p(long) means: .518, .555, .588, .593, 
.604). Furthermore, Block 1 was significantly different from Block 2, and they were 
both significantly different from Block 3, 4, and 5. Finally, there was no significant 
difference after Block 3 suggesting again that perhaps a peak in p(long) responses 
had been reached.  
 There was also a main effect of Duration, F(6, 402) = 1247.78, p < .001, η2p = 
.949, with observed power (1-β) = 1.00 (α = .05), indicating as expected that the 
p(long) values would increase as the time duration increased (respective means for 
 
3 Participants with BP values outside the range of 400ms and 1600ms were excluded from the 





400 to 1600ms: .042, .149, .422, .702, .838, .909, and .938). Furthermore, there was 
a significant Block by Duration interaction, F(24, 1608) = 10.35, p < .001, η2p = .134, 
with observed power (1-β) = 0.98 (α = .05). Further post-hoc analysis revealed that 
for the durations of 400ms and 600ms Block 1 and Block 2 were significantly 
different to the rest of the blocks, for the duration of 800ms Block 1 was significantly 
different to the rest of the Blocks, and for the duration of 1000ms Blocks 1 and 2 
were significantly different to Blocks 3, 4, and 5. For the durations of 1200, 1400, 
1600ms no significant simple effects were observed, see Figure 10.  
There was also a significant Image by Salience interaction, F(1, 67) = 25.50, p < 
.001, η2p = .276, with observed power (1-β) = 0.99 (α = .05), with post-hoc analysis 
revealing significant simple main effects of Salience and Image, see Figure 11 for 
details. Finally, there was a significant Salience by Duration by Group interaction, 
F(6, 402) = 2.35, p = .031, η2p = .034, with observed power (1-β) = 0.97 (α = .05),. 
However, post-hoc analysis did not reveal any significant simple effects. There were 




Figure 10. P(long) ratio of responses per duration and block indicate a tendency to overestimate 







Figure 11. Simple effect of Salience for both Image type indicates an underestimation of time for 
Facebook salient stimuli compared to matched neutral and Internet salient. 
BP Analysis 
 A four-way ANOVA for BP including Group(2), Image(2), Salience(2), and 
Block(5) was carried out. There was a significant main effect of Block, F(4, 268) = 
18.38, p < .001, η2p = .215, with observed power (1-β) = 1.00 (α = .05),indicating that 
BPs were significantly reducing from Blocks 1 to 5 (respectively  979.80ms, 
928.48ms, 875.51ms, 866.86ms, and 850.00ms) with no significant difference 
between Blocks 1 and 2 but these were both significantly different from Blocks 3, 4 
and 5. These findings are in line with Experiment 5 and provide more evidence that 
we tend to overestimate time as we repeat a task. There was also a significant 
Image by Salience interaction, F(1, 67) = 24.62, p < .001, η2p = .269, with observed 
power (1-β) = 0.99 (α = .05),with post-hoc analysis revealing significant simple 
effects of salience for both Facebook (p = .002) and Internet images (p = .005) but 
with opposite direction, see Figure 12. There were no other significant main effects 






Figure 12. Image by Salience interaction indicates an overall underestimation of time for Facebook 
salient stimuli compared to Facebook matched neutral and Internet salient stimuli 
 
WR Analysis 
 A four-way ANOVA for WR including Group(2), Image(2), Salience(2), and 
Block(5) was carried out. There was a significant main effect of Block, F(4, 268) = 
8.01, p < .001, η2p = .107, with observed power (1-β) = 0.99 (α = .05),indicating that 
WRs were significantly increasing from Blocks 1 to 5 (respectively  .185, .202, .213, 
.239, .262) as a result of reduced discriminability, possibly due to fatigue or reduced 
arousal. There was also a significant Image by Salience interaction, F(1,67) = 10.01, 
p = .002, η2p = .130, with observed power (1-β) = 0.88 (α = .05). However, post-hoc 
analysis did not reveal any significant simple effects (p’s > .3). 
YIAT Score and Correlations 
 The YIAT scores varied from 1 to 64 (MYIAT = 33.60, SDYIAT =13.44). Thirty- 
participants had scores between 30 and 49 and were classified as average online 





frequent problems due to Internet use. There were no participants with scores higher 
than 80 that would indicate significant problems due to use of Internet (Young, 
1998).  Furthermore, we ran correlational analysis between the YIAT scores and the 
attentional bias scores (salient –matched) in BP and WR for each image type in each 
block. All correlations were non-significant (r’s < .244, p’s > .103). 
 
Experiment 6: Discussion 
The aim of this experiment was to replicate the findings of Experiment 5 and 
at the same time assess the impact of accessing Facebook either during the first 
break or during each break. Similarly to Experiment 5, we employed a modified 
temporal bisection task and looked into possible effects of salient stimuli on the 
predictions of the internal clock due to either attention, arousal, or both (for more 
details see Experiment 5: Discussion). All findings were very similar to the ones 
reported in Experiment 5. 
Our data provided further support for attentional effects as predicted by a 
mode switch in the internal clock model. Again, we found that as Block increased BP 
decreased suggesting an overestimation of time. Furthermore, there were again 
higher BP scores for Facebook than Internet stimuli providing additional support to 
our prior claim that Facebook salient stimuli can cause greater attentional bias 
compared to Internet salient stimuli. This replicated finding adds to our previous 
evidence that accessing Facebook is intrinsically different to a general use of the 
Internet and an interesting finding that future research could focus on. 
Contrary to Experiment 5, this time we also had a significant block effect in 
WR clearly showing that participants’ temporal discriminability deteriorated as they 
progressed through the blocks. Even though there was a similar trend in Experiment 
5, finding significant differences in Experiment 6 could be due to accessing 
Facebook which could have resulted in increased cognitive load and fatigue. 
Furthermore, we did not observe any salience effects on WR which previously we 
have associated with craving to use Facebook and Internet as a result of being 
exposed to salient stimuli as predicted by Franken (2003), and Kavanagh et al., 
(2005). These craving effects could have now disappeared as participants were able 





   
Experiment 7: Introduction 
 Focusing on the results of Experiments 5 and 6 we could conclude that there 
was no further need to include five blocks as the temporal distortion effects due to 
salience would mainly occur during the first two blocks. Furthermore, fatigue was the 
main driving factor in blocks 3 to 5. In addition, in Experiment 6 we observed that 
allowing participants to access their Facebook accounts affected their temporal 
discriminability. However, we did not include a control condition or even a condition 
with an Internet related activity. This posed the question whether the observed 
behaviour was due to the nature of accessing Facebook, or whether it would occur 
with any given task as a break.   
 In the current Experiment 7 we aimed to address this limitation of Experiment 
6 by adding two matched conditions as well as increasing the duration of the 
between two blocks break activity. This time, the task involved either accessing their 
Facebook account on the experiment PC, or accessing and reading a psychology 
paper online, or reading the same paper in a printed form. Participants were 
allocated to one of the three tasks randomly at the beginning of the experiment. Our 
hypothesis was that if the previous findings were due to the nature of accessing 
Facebook, then we should observe difference between the three groups. 
Furthermore,  
Experiment 7: Method 
Participants 
 One hundred and thirty-seven psychology students (101 females, 23 males) 
were recruited via the Kent Psychology RPS website for course credit. The mean 
age was 19.32 with a standard deviation of 2.32 (age ranged from 18 to 41). 
Participants had to be over 18 years old and have a Facebook® account in order to 
participate. 
Design 
 The experiment employed a 2x2x2x7x3 mixed design. Image (Facebook, 





1200, 1400, 1600ms) were the within-subjects the IVs and Group (Access Facebook, 
Read Online, Read Printed) was the between-subjects IV. The dependent measures 
were the mean proportion of “long” responses p(long), the Bisection Point (BP), and 
the Weber’s Ratio (WR). 
 
Experiment 7: Results4 
P(long) Analysis 
 The p(long) values were entered into a five-way analysis of variance including 
Image, Salience, Block, Duration, and Group. There was a main effect of Block, F(1, 
121) = 88.85, p < .001, η2p = .423, with observed power (1-β) = 1.00 (α = .05), 
indicating that participants underestimated time in Block 1 (M = .527) compared to 
Block 2 (M = .594). There was also a Salience main effect, F(1, 121) = 6.76, p = .01, 
η2p = .053, with observed power (1-β) = 0.73 (α = .05),showing an underestimation of 
time for Salient stimuli (M = .556) compared to Neutral (M = .566). As expected, 
there was also a main effect of duration, F(6, 726) = 1941.4, p < .001, η2p = .941, 
showing that the p(long) values would increase as the time duration increased 
(respective means for 400 to 1600ms: .034, .115, .381, .680, .846, .926, and .944).  
 Furthermore, there was a significant Block by Duration interaction, F(6, 726) = 
20.99, p < .001, η2p = .148, with observed power (1-β) = 1.00 (α = .05),further post-
hoc analysis revealed significant differences between Blocks in all durations (all p’s < 
.013), see Figure 13. Block by Duration. There was also a significant Salience by 
Duration interaction, F(6, 726) = 3.73, p = .001, η2p = .030, with observed power (1-β) 
= 0.96 (α = .05),further post-hoc analysis revealed significant differences between 
Salient and Neutral stimuli at 400, 600, and 800ms (all p’s < .04), see Figure 14.  
There was also a four- way interaction of Session x Image x Duration x Group, F(12, 
726) = 1.86, p = .036, η2p = .030, with observed power (1-β) = 0.90 (α = .05),however, 
post-hoc analysis did not reveal any significant simple effects (all p’s > .1).  
 
4 Participants with BP values outside the range of 400ms and 1600ms were excluded from the 










Figure 14. Salience by Duration interaction for 
p(long) values 
BP Analysis 
 A four-way ANOVA for BP including Group(2), Image(2), Salience(2), and 
Block(2) was carried out. There was a significant main effect of Block, F(1, 121) = 
81.27, p < .001, η2p = .402, with observed power (1-β) = 1.00 (α = .05), with BP 
increasing from Block 1 (M = 967.01) to Block 2 (M = 870.03) indicating an 
overestimation of time for Block 2 compared to Block 1. There was also a main effect 
of Salience, F(1, 121) = 5.10, p = .026, η2p = .040, with observed power (1-β) = 0.61 
(α = .05), revealing an underestimation of time for Salient stimuli (M = 925.24) 
compared to Neutral stimuli (M = 911.79). There were no other significant main 
effects or interactions (all F’s < 2 and p’s > .1). 
WR Analysis 
 A four-way ANOVA for WR including Group(2), Image(2), Salience(2), and 
Block(2) was carried out. There was a significant main effect of Salience, F(1, 121) = 
8.35, p = .005, η2p = .065, with observed power (1-β) = 0.82 (α = .05),with lower WR 
mean values for Salient stimuli (M = .174) compared to Neutral stimuli (M = .192), 
indicating a better discriminability of time for Salient stimuli. There was also a 





.030, with observed power (1-β) = 0.48 (α = .05). Post-hoc analysis revealed 
significant differences between Salient and Neutral stimuli in Block 2 (p < .001) but 
not in Block 1. There were no other significant main effects or interactions (all F’s < 2 
and p’s > .1). 
YIAT Score and Correlations 
 The YIAT scores varied from 6 to 62 (MYIAT = 29.61, SDYIAT =13.27). Fifty-two 
participants had scores between 30 and 49 and were classified as average online 
users, 8 had scores between 50 and 79 and were classified as online users with 
frequent problems due to Internet use. There were no participants with scores higher 
than 80 that would indicate significant problems due to use of Internet (Young, 
1998).  Furthermore, we ran correlational analysis between the YIAT scores and the 
attentional bias scores (salient –matched) in BP and WR for each image type in each 
block. All correlations were non-significant (r’s < .124, p’s > .169). 
 
Experiment 7: Discussion 
 With the current experiment we aimed at addressing the lack of controlled 
conditions in Experiment 6. We therefore included two additional groups, one using 
the Internet to access and read a paper and one reading a printed version of the 
same paper. This was done in order to answer the question whether the results in 
Experiment 6 were driven by the intrinsic nature of accessing Facebook or whether 
they were driven by the fact that participants were allowed a controlled break that 
added to their fatigue. Our results indicate that there were no significant effects of 
group suggesting that the differences observed were not associated to accessing 
Facebook itself. Instead, we observed familiar block effects indicating that 
participants overall underestimated durations for block 1 compared to block 2.  
 Furthermore, there were significant main effects of salience both in terms of 
BP and WR in a consistent manner to Experiments and 5, to some extent. Again, 
salient stimuli were associated with underestimation of durations compared to 
neutral stimuli. This provided further support to our claims that salient stimuli can 
cause intrusive thoughts that initiate a cycle of craving resulting in attentional bias 





WR results indicated that there were also familiar to previous experiments arousal 
effects that led to better discriminability for salient stimuli compared to neutrals ones. 
This was also in line with the predictions discussed above. 
 
Experiment 8: Introduction 
 In the previous three experiments we have consistently observed temporal 
distortions both in the terms of BP and WR and we have interpreted these effects as 
results of emotional and arousing addiction related content of the stimuli. However, 
we cannot at this stage eliminate the scenario that these effects are merely 
familiarity effects. In order to answer the question whether addiction related content 
or familiarity drive these effects we will use a modified temporal bisection task with 
associated non-words instead of images.  
 Richards and Blanchette (2004) used a modified emotional Stroop paradigm 
where participants first associated non-words with emotional and neutral images. 
They then carried out the Stroop task using the associated non-words. Analysis 
showed that high anxious participants were slower at responding the colour of the 
emotional words compared to the neutral ones. Similar finding were also reported by 
Sharma & Money (2010) where participants learnt associations between non-words 
with addiction related and neutral stimuli. The results were similar to Richards and 
Blanchette’s findings. Drug users were slower are responding the colours of cocaine 
associated non-words compared to non-drug associated non-words.  
 These two studies provided evidence that the Stroop interference from 
addiction related stimuli is due to addiction related content and not to visual 
confounds. Therefore, we hypothesised that if the observed temporal distortions 
were due to addiction related content we should be able to observe similar 
distortions for the Facebook associated non-words and not for the neutral associated 
non-words. 
Experiment 8: Method 
Participants 
 Ninety-five psychology students (80 females, 15 males) were recruited via the 





standard deviation of 2.64 (age ranged from 18 to 41). Participants had to be over 18 
years old and have a Facebook® account in order to participate. 
Design 
 The experiment employed a 3x7 within-subjects design. Word (Salient, 
Neutral Familiar, Neutral Unfamiliar) x Duration (400, 600, 800, 1000, 1200, 1400, 
1600ms) were the within-subjects IVs. The dependent measures for the Temporal 
Bisection task were the mean proportion of “long” responses p(long), the Bisection 
Point (BP), and the Weber’s Ratio (WR). The dependent variables for the recognition 
task were accuracy (Hit rates, False alarm rates) and confidence ratings. 
Materials 
 Visual Stimuli. The same 20 images from Experiment 5 were used during the 
memory association task. Furthermore, 21 non-words (non-existing, made-up words) 
were generated from The English Lexicon Project website (Balota et al., 2007). The 
criteria were: Mean Length = 6, and Ortho_N = 0 (Orthographic Neighborhood: the 
number of words that be produced if one character in the given word changes to 
another character, for example the word ‘CAT’ can give the word ‘BAT’. In order to 
minimise the chances of activating existing words during the experiment the criterion 
of zero was adopted. The actual characteristics of the generated non-words were: 
Mean Length = 5.95, and Ortho_N = 0.3, see Appendix I. 
 Questionnaires The CIUS (Meerkerk et al., 2009) and the YIAT were used in 
this experiment and were presented online using the Qualtrics website (Qualtrics ©, 
http://www.qualtrics.com, 2015). For more information on both, see Chapter 2, Exp 2 
or Appendices D and C. 
Procedure 
 Participants were briefed and provided signed consent before entering an 
individual cubicle to complete the computerised tasks. The order of the tasks was 
memory association task, temporal bisection task, recognition task, and finally the 
completion of questionnaires. 
 Memory Association Task. During this task participants had to learn 
associations between the non-words and the selected images. The task was 





Facebook related associations of five Facebook salient images with five non-words. 
A second block included Internet related association of five Internet salient images 
with five non-words. Finally, a third block included neutral associations of five neutral 
images with five non-words, these 15 words were characterised as Old. Five non-
words were not presented at all in this task and were left for the memory recognition 
task, they were characterised as New. Before each block participants received 
specific instruactions, “An Internet (Facebook or neutral for the other blocks) related 
picture will first come on the screen. A made-up word (non-word) will then appear at 
the center of the screen. Pay close attention to both the picture and the word that will 
be presented.”. In each block they saw twice all possible combinations of the five 
images and five non-words (25 combinations). First the image would come on the 
screen and after 500ms the word would follow for an additional 1500ms, there was 
also an inter-trial duration of 1000ms, this resulted in 50 trials per block with a total 
duration of 150sec. Every block lasted exactly 150sec to avoid differences in the 
duration of learning association that could impact memory performance.  
 Temporal Bisection Task. The temporal bisection task in structure and 
timings was identical to the one in Experiment 5 (two training tasks and one main 
task). The key difference here was that the stimuli were non-words and not images. 
In order to stay consistent with the training tasks in Experiment 5 where one neutral 
stimulus was used throughout, the non-word “tryles” was selected to be the training 
stimulus. During the main task participants would see one non-word at a time on the 
screen for durations of 400 to 1600ms and they had to respond whether that duration 
felt “short” or “long”. 
 Recognition Task. During this task all 20 non-words were presented at the 
screen one at time and the participant had to respond whether the non-word was 
presented during the Facebook, Internet, or neutral association, or whether it was 
new never seen before non-word. Once they gave a response, they had to also 
record how confident they felt about the answer 1, Not confident at all to 5, Very 
confident. For both questions there was no time pressure.  
  Questionnaires. When all the above tasks were completed, participants 
completed the CIUS and Facebook modified CIUS questionnaires, see Appendices 





Experiment 8: Results 
P(long) Analysis 
 The p(long) values were entered into a two-way analysis of variance including 
Word and Duration. There was a main effect of Word, F(1, 92) = 5.297, p = .024, η2p 
= .054, with observed power (1-β) = 0.63 (α = .05).Further pairwise comparisons 
revealed that p(long) values for Salient words was significantly lower to the p(long) 
values of Neutral words (p < .001), no difference was observed between Neutral 
Familiar and Neutral unfamiliar (Respective means: Msal = .550, MNF = .563, MNUnf = 
.564). These results indicate that participants underestimated durations for Salient 
words only. Furthermore, there was a main effect of Duration, F(6, 552) = 1941.4, p 
< .001, η2p = .910,  with observed power (1-β) = 1.00 (α = .05), showing that the 
p(long) values would increase as the time duration increased (respective means for 
400 to 1600ms: .034, .101, .377, .670, .856, .906, and .944). No significant 
interaction of Word by Duration was observed, F(12, 1104) = 0.740, p = .713, η2p = 
.008, with observed power (1-β) = 0.11 (α = .05). 
 
BP Analysis 
 The BP values were entered into a one-way ANOVA with Word as the IV. 
There was a significant main effect, F(2, 184) = 81.27, p = .016, η2p = .062, with 
observed power (1-β) = 0.68 (α = .05). Similarly, with the p(long) analysis, pairwise 
comparisons revealed significant differences in the BP values between Salient and 
Neutral words (p < .001) but not between Neutral Familiar and Neutral Unfamiliar 
words (Respective means: Msal = 933.89, MNF = 914.49, MNUnf = 916.12). This again 
indicates that participants underestimated durations for Salient words compared to 
Neutral words. 
WR Analysis 
 The WR values were entered into a one-way ANOVA with Word as the IV. 
There was no significant main effect, F(2, 184) = 0.106, p = .899, η2p = .001, with 
observed power (1-β) = 0.07 (α = .05). This indicated no differences in temporal 





MNF = 0.198, MNUnf = 0.200). A possible explanation for this finding could be that the 
associated words could elicit attentional effects (differences in BP values) but not 
arousal effects, hence no differences in WR values. 
  
CIUS and Facebook modified CIUS correlations 
 The differences between each type of word were calculated for both BP and 
WR values. A correlational analysis was then carried out with the said differences 
and the CIUS and F/CIUS scores. CIUS and F/CIUS were highly correlated, r = .608, 
p < .001. No other significant correlations were discovered. 
 
Experiment 8: Discussion 
 One remaining criticism for Experiments 5-7 had to with the fact that 
participants could have been more familiar with the Internet and Facebook stimuli 
compared to the neutral matched ones that were entirely novel. This posed the 
question whether the results were driven by familiarity and not addiction related 
salience per se. In order to address this question, we designed a novel memory 
association modified temporal bisection task where participants learned associations 
of non-words with different types of stimuli and then performed the temporal 
bisection task with the learnt non-words. 
 Our results indicated that familiarity was not driving the distorted time 
perception effects since there were no significant differences between familiar and 
unfamiliar non-words. The differences observed between Facebook associated and 
neutral associated non-words suggest that emotional content rather than familiarity 
of the Facebook stimuli is driving the temporal distortion as a result of preferential 
allocation of attentional resources. These findings are in line with previous findings of 
memory associated Stroop tasks using emotional or addiction related stimuli 
(Richards & Blanchette, 2004; Sharma & Money, 2010). Participants demonstrated 
attentional bias effects for the non-words associated with emotional and addiction 
related stimuli respectively.  We can therefore safely conclude that Internet and 
Facebook related stimuli can distort our time perception as a result of attention and 







In conclusion, we believe that time perception in general, and the temporal 
bisection task specifically, can be a valuable tool in the study of addiction, 
substance-related or not at both theoretical and methodological levels.  The overall 
findings of chapter 4 show clearly that the temporal bisection task can be used to 
demonstrate intrusive cognitions from addiction related stimuli. Furthermore, 
applying the internal clock model allows us to distinguish between attentional effects 
(mode switch) and arousal effects (pacemaker). This provides an advantage over 
other implicit tasks used in addiction research (e.g., dot-probe, Stroop) where 
intrusive cognitions can be detected but not distinguished between attention and 
arousal effects. Furthermore, in the case of IA, investigating time perception is even 
more important as one of the side-effects could be the time lost in the net. The 
current chapter also identified the need for further investigation on the differences in 
different types of IA. It would also be valuable to employ different paradigms from the 
time perception research (e.g. time production) and attempt to further distinguish the 
individual roles of attention and arousal. Finally, the role of memory was not 
examined at all in this chapter and it would be interesting to investigate how memory 
can interact with both attention and arousal under the predictions of the internal clock 





 : MEMORY LOAD 
In the previous chapters, we explored the role of salient stimuli on time 
perception. We consistently reported that Gambling, Facebook or Internet related 
stimuli can lead to distorted time perception either due to attentional or arousal 
effects. As described earlier the internal clock also consists of a decision-making 
component that compares the perceived duration of a current event to the stored 
duration of the two standard events, short and long. It is apparent that this 
component heavily relies on working memory capacity for both storing durations and 
retrieving the standards durations. In this chapter, we will explore whether 
manipulating working memory capacity can affect the impact that salient stimuli have 
on time perception. 
Experiment 9 N-back: Introduction 
Previous research in time perception has established what is known as the 
interference effect (Brown, 1997a). In general, participants demonstrate distorted 
time perception when asked to perform demanding cognitive tasks together with 
temporal estimation or production (Block, Hancock, & Zakay, 2010b). One 
explanation is the effect manifests as an underestimation of the perceived duration 
due to the attentional gate being switched-off (distraction), while we attend to non-
temporal tasks. Hence, this divided attention causes the temporal underestimation. A 
second, more holistic explanation, is the interference effect is due to increased 
cognitive load, either attentional or memory related. Theoretical support for such an 
interference effect comes from an attentional allocation model, as proposed by many 
researchers, which argues that attention is as a multi-dimensional system that 
shares resources with other cognitive functions (Block & Zakay, 1997; Brown, 1997b; 
L. Casini, Macar, & Grondin, 1992; Fortin, Rousseau, Bourque, & Kirouac, 1993; 
Grondin, 2010; Posner, 2012; Tsal, Shalev, & Mevorach, 2005; Dan Zakay & Block, 
1996, 2004).  
This dual approach of distraction or cognitive load has been supported by a 
number of studies (for a review see Block et al., 2010). However, Fortin et al., (1993) 
were among the first to argue that this interference affect is not a mere result of 





cognitive resources left for time keeping were not a result of complexity or difficulty 
but a result of short-term memory involvement. They conducted four experiments in 
total, with experiments 1 and 2 involving visual search and short-term memory and 
experiments 3 and 4 involving visual search but not short-term memory. In 
experiment one participants had to produce temporal intervals of 2-sec while 
performing a visual search of a target comparing it to a set of memorised items. The 
target could either be present or absent in each trial and the memory set could vary 
from one to six items. Results indicated that the temporal interval was lengthen as 
the memory set increased in items. In experiment two, the memory set was restricted 
to one item but the visual search presented stimuli would vary from one to five. The 
results were similar to experiment one. In the final two experiments, there was no 
short-memory component and no lengthening of the interval production was 
observed. This provided an initial support to the claim that restricting short-term 
memory related attentional resources could affect time perception. Furthermore, 
attentional load that is not related to short-term memory does not have a similar 
effect.  
Despite the fact that temporal perception performance in dual-task paradigms 
has been investigated for the 30 years memory load is still relatively under-
researched compared to other cognitive load dual-tasks (Block et al., 2010b). 
Furthermore, of the little research that has been published very few publications 
used emotional stimuli in the temporal processing task in dual-task paradigms and to 
the knowledge of the author there is no research that investigated how memory load 
would affect time perception when the temporal task includes addiction-related 
stimuli. This is despite the fact that dual-task paradigms have been used in 
experimental paradigms with addiction related stimuli both with healthy and clinical 
populations (e.g., Christiansen, Schoenmakers, & Field, 2015; Cox, Fadardi, 
Intriligator, & Klinger, 2018; Cox et al., 2006; Field, Marhe, & Spectrums, 2014; Matt 
Field & Cox, 2008).  
Non-substance addiction theories such as Franken’s (2003), Kavanagh et al., 
2005), Tiffany's cognitive model on drug urges (1990), Griffiths' (2005) argue that 
attentional bias towards addiction related stimuli is an automatic process that relies 
on salience of said stimuli. This salience activates a process of elaborate intrusive 
thoughts that can distract participants from the given task. It is therefore valuable to 





Previous research has demonstrated that in Stroop tasks increased working 
memory load resulted in greater distractor interference (de Fockert, Rees, Frith, & 
Lavie, 2001; Konstantinou, Beal, King, & Lavie, 2014; Lavie, Beck, & Konstantinou, 
2014.; Lavie & De Fockert, 2005). Lavie and de Fockert (2005) conducted a series of 
experiments where they manipulated the working memory load in a visual search 
task. Participants had to look for a diamond shape among circles and report the 
orientation of a line inside it. Furthermore, some trials included a coloured singleton 
as a distractor. At the beginning of each trial, a number of digits had to be 
memorised and at the end of the visual search a single digit was presented. 
Participants had to recall the digit that followed the probe in the learnt sequence. 
Results indicated that the singleton distractor effect was greater under increased 
memory load. Lavie’s load theory of attention (2005) proposed a cognitive control 
model where distractors have reduced interference effects when cognitive resources 
are available to be allocated to the task at hand. In other words, low cognitive load 
should result in lesser distractor interference compared to high cognitive load. 
Since then large volume of research has mainly reported findings that support 
Lavie’s model (for review and historical context see Konstantinou et al., 2014; Lavie 
et al., 2013.). There are however instances where findings pointed to exact opposite 
direction. Berggren, Richards, Taylor, and  Derakshan (2013) conducted an 
experiment where participants had to perform an antisaccade task under cognitive 
load. The antisaccade task involved seeing expressions of angry, happy, or neutral 
faces and the load task involved recognising auditory tones. Their findings indicated 
that under low load there were differences in performance depending on the emotion 
of the face and that these differences disappeared in increased load.  Specifically, 
participants demonstrated slower saccade latencies under high load compared to 
low load. Furthermore, post-hoc analysis indicated that there were no expression 
differences for high load whereas for low load participants demonstrated higher 
latencies for angry faces and lower latencies for happy faces. These results provided 
support for Dillen  and Koole’s proposition (2009) that vigilance towards emotional 
content is not automatic  but rather a top-down process that is controlled by working 
memory. Therefore, it is crucial that the effect of salient distractors in our time 
perception is investigated under high and low cognitive load. 
The current experiment aimed at investigating the effects of memory load on 





by two distinct models (Lavie’s and Dillen and Koole’s) this exploration will also 
provide more support on whether memory load facilitates or inhibits distractors’ 
interference effects. We manipulated the memory load by utilising the N-back task. 
Specifically, we used 1-back for low memory load and 2-back for high memory load 
interleaved with Facebook and Internet modified temporal bisection trials as 
described in the previous two chapters. 
Experiment 9 N-back: Method 
Participants 
 In total, 81 participants were recruited for this experiment (10 males and 71 
females) via the RPS website. All participants were students at the University of Kent 
aged between 18 and 31 (M = 18.92, SD = 1.68). Participants were required to have 
an active Facebook account in order to be allowed to complete the experiment. 
Design 
 This was a mixed-design experiment with Image (Facebook, Internet), 
Salience (Salient, Neutral), Duration (400, 600, 800, 1000, 1200, 1400, 1600ms), 
Difficulty (1-back, 2-back) being within-subjects factors and Order (1-back First, 2-
back First) being a between-subjects factor. Participants had to report the duration of 
presented events as either long or short. These responses were used to calculate 
the dependent variable of p(long) as the proportion of long responses over the total 
number of trials. The p(long) responses were further used to obtain the Bisection 
Point (BP) and the Weber’s Ratio (WR) psychometrics. Furthermore, for the N-back 
task they had to report whether the current trial was matching a previous trial. These 
responses were used to calculate the average of correct responses. 
 
Materials 
 This experiment employed a dual task combining the TB task used in previous 
experiments (e.g., Exp 5, Chapter 4) and a 1-back and 2-back tasks. As such, the 
materials used for the TB trials were as mentioned in the previous experiments (140 
trials). For both the 1-back and 2-back tasks single digit numbers were used and 





matched trials (140 trials). Participants were instructed that they had up to three 
seconds to respond and they should try to do so as fast and as accurate as they can. 
Furthermore, Young’s YIAT was used as in previous experiments. For a snapshot of 
Experiment 9 see Figure 15 
 




 After being briefed and providing consent, each participant completed the 
experiment in individual cubicles. The experiment was comprised of two separate 
phases of the dual task with low difficulty (1-back) and high difficulty (2-back). 
Participants would first complete the low difficulty or high difficulty depending on the 
level of Order that they were randomly assigned at. Each phase included a training 
block for the relevant N-back task, 15 trials (33% matched, 67% non-matched), and 
then training blocks for the TB task as described in earlier experiments. Following 
that, they would complete the dual task, including the relevant N-back task. Upon 
completing one phase participants would then proceed to complete the other 
difficulty phase. Finally, all participants would complete Young’s YIAT. They would 







Experiment 9: Results 
Data Preparation  
 For each participant the mean correct responses were calculated for the 1-
back and 2-back trials. Furthermore, for the TB trials the p(long) was calculated per 
Image, Salience, and Duration. Furthermore, the BP and WR scores were calculated 
per Image and Salience. Any participant with N-back mean below 60% and BP 
outside the 400 and 1600ms was excluded from the analysis. This resulted in 
dropping 16 participants. 
N-back Analysis  
 The mean correct responses were entered into a two-way ANOVA with 
Difficulty (low, high) and Order (1-back first, 2-back first). There was a main effect of 
Difficulty, F(1, 63) = 175.68, p < .001, η2p = .736. This indicated that performance was 
significantly worse for the 2-back task (M2-back = .77, SD2-back= .083) compared to the 
1-back task (M1-back = .90, SD2-back= .057). This was expected and was in line with 
previous research. There was no main effect of Order, F(1, 63) = 2.46, p = .122, η2p = 
.038. Indicating there was no overall difference in participants’ N-back accuracy 
depending on which task they did first (M1 = .85, SD1 = .06, M2 = .82, SD2 = .07. 
There was a significant interaction of Difficulty by Order, F(1, 63) = 14.85, p < .001, 
η2p = .191. Further post-hoc analysis revealed a significant simple main effect of 
Order for the 2-back task (p = .003, M1 = .80, SD1 = .05, M2 = .74, SD2 = .06) but not 
for the 1-back task (p = .280, M1 = .89, SD1 = .03, M2 = .90, SD2 = .05). This 
indicated that participants found the 2-back task significantly more difficult when it 
was completed first, compared to when it was completed second. This could be due 
to participants becoming better at the task when they completed the easier task first. 
P(long) Analysis 
 The p(long) values were entered into a 5-way ANOVA with Difficulty, Image, 
Salience, Duration as within-subjects factors, and Order as between-subjects factor. 
There was a main effect of Difficulty, F(1, 63) = 15.377, p < .001, η2p = .196, with 
observed power (1-β) = 0.97 (α = .05). This indicated that participants overestimated 
time in the low difficulty (Mlow = .61, SDlow= .06) compared to the high difficulty (Mhigh 





resources to be allocated to the time keeping compared to the more difficult task. 
Hence, increasing attention on the TB task, which has been found in the past to lead 
to time overestimation.    
 There was also a main effect of Duration, F(6, 378) = 916.13, p < .001, η2p = 
.936, with observed power (1-β) = 1.00 (α = .05) (respective means for 400 to 
1600ms: .066, .166, .451, .729, .853, .918, and .937). This was as expected and in 
line with all previous experiments and research. All other main effects were non-
significant (all F’s < 2.14, p’s > .14) 
 There was a significant interaction of Image by Salience, F(1, 63) = 4.79, p = 
.032, η2p = .071, with observed power (1-β) = 0.58 (α = .05) and a significant 
interaction of Image by Salience by Duration, F(6, 378) = 4.61, p < .001, η2p = .068, 
with observed power (1-β) = 0.92 (α = .05). Following up post-hoc analysis revealed 
significant differences between Salient and Neutral Facebook images for the 
Durations of: 600ms, p = .015; 800ms, p = .002; 1000ms, p = .002, 1600ms, p = .02. 
Detailed comparisons between Image and Salience see Figure 16.  
 
 Finally, there was a significant Difficulty by Salience by Duration by Order 
interaction, F(6, 378) = 2.23, p = .039, η2p = .034, with observed power (1-β) = 0.78 (α 
= .05). This included a number of two-way and three way-interactions that were 
significant (all p’s < .05, Difficulty by Order, Difficulty by Duration, Difficulty by 
Duration by Order, Salience by Duration, Salience by Duration by Order). Post-hoc 
analysis indicated that there were more durations that varied significantly between 
salient and neutral stimuli when the task was easier (1-back first, 2-back second) 
compared to when the task was more difficult (2-back first, 1-back second). For more 




















 The BP values were entered into a four-way Anova with Difficulty, Image, 
Duration, and Order as factors. There was a significant main effect of Difficulty, F(1, 
63) = 13.47, p = .001, η2p = .176, with observed power (1-β) = 0.95 (α = .05). This 
indicated that participants had lower BP value, hence overestimated time, for the low 
difficulty (Mlow = 847.54, SDlow= 138.77) compared to the high difficulty (Mhigh = 
906.01, SDhigh= 183.98). This finding is in line with the plong analysis.  
 There was a also a significant Difficulty by Order interaction, F(1, 63) = 28.90, 
p < .001, η2p = .314, with observed power (1-β) = 1.00 (α = .05) and a significant 
Difficulty by Image by Salience by Order interaction, , F(1, 63) = 28.90, p = .043, η2p = 
.098, with observed power (1-β) = 0.83 (α = .05). Follow up post-hoc analysis 
revealed a significant simple main effect of Salience for the Facebook images during 
the 1-back task only when the 1-back task was presented second, p = .016 
(respective means: MSal = 820.06, SDSal = 203.11; MSal = 770.14, SDSal= 236.96). All 
other pairwise comparisons were non-significant (all p’s > .05). Similarly, to the plong 
analysis, this finding suggests that we only observe salience effects in low difficulty 
and not in high difficulty. All other main effects and interactions were non-significant. 
WR Analysis 
 The WR values were entered into a four-way Anova with Difficulty, Image, 
Duration, and Order as factors. There was a significant main effect of Difficulty, F(1, 
63) = 20.45, p < .001, η2p = .245, with observed power (1-β) = 0.99 (α = .05) . This 
indicates that participants had lower WR values for the low difficulty compared to the 
high difficulty, hence better temporal discriminability (Mlow = 0.200, SDlow= 0.08; Mhigh 
= .251, SDhigh= 0.08). According to (Gonidis & Sharma, 2017) lower WR values could 
be interpreted as evidence of increased arousal, indicating that emotional effects on 
participants were greater for the low difficulty.  
 There was also a main effect of Salience, F(1, 63) = 12.98, p = .001, η2p = 
.171. This indicates that participants had lower WR values for the salient compared 
to neutral stimuli, hence better temporal discriminability (MSal = 0.213, SDSal= 0.07; 
MNeut = .238, SDNeut= 0.08). Similarly, with the above this could be an indication that 





Furthermore, the Salience by Order interaction was significant, F(1, 63) = 6.11, p = 
.016, η2p = .088. Post-hoc analysis revealed that the WR differences between salient 
and neutral stimuli were greater when the 1-back task was presented second (MSal = 
0.212, SDSal= 0.09; MNeut = .283, SDNeut= 0.09; p < .001) compared to when it was 
presented first (MSal = 0.215, SDSal= 0.08; MNeut = .222, SDNeut= 0.08; p > .1). 
 Finally, there was a marginally non-significant interaction of Image by 
Salience, F(1, 63) = 3.88, p = .053, η2p = .058. Follow up analysis revealed that there 
was a significant simple main effect of Salience only for the Facebook images 
(Facebook: MSal = 0.203, SDSal= 0.07; MNeut = .247, SDNeut= 0.08; p = .001) and not 
the Internet images (Internet: MSal = 0.223, SDSal= 0.08; MNeut = .228, SDNeut= 0.08; p 
= .693). This again suggests Facebook stimuli seem to be driving the temporal 
distortion effects. All other main effects and interactions were non-significant.  
 YIAT Scores and Correlational Analysis 
 The YIAT scores varied from 4 to 74 (MYIAT = 34.91, SDYIAT =13.32). Twenty-
three participants had scores between 4 and 30, 36 had scores between 31 and 49, 
and five had scores between 50 and 79. There were no participants with scores 
higher than 80 that would indicate significant problems due to use of Internet (Young, 
1998).  Furthermore, we ran correlational analysis between the YIAT scores and the 
attentional bias scores (salient –neutral) in BP and WR for each image type and 
difficulty. All correlations were non-significant (r’s < .173, p’s > .090). 
Experiment 9 N-back: Discussion 
 
 The aim of this experiment was to explore the impact of working memory load 
on time perception. On the effects of working memory load on time perception in 
general, previous research has consistently reported that increasing working 
memory load results in overall underestimation of durations. This finding was 
successfully replicated in the current experiment in terms of p(long) and BP values 
where increased difficulty resulted in underestimation of durations. This provides 
further support to the attentional allocation model and indeed supports the notion 
that attention is a multi-dimension system that shares a pool of resources with other 





et al., 1993; Grondin, 2010; Posner, 2012; Tsal et al., 2005; Dan Zakay & Block, 
1996, 2004). Furthermore, participants exhibited lower WR values in low difficulty 
compared to high difficulty. Lower WR values are associated with better temporal 
discriminability. This finding provides further support to the argument of shared 
attentional resources as participants’ discriminability deteriorates as difficulty 
increases. 
 The second aim of the study was to investigate the impact of increased working 
memory load on the interference of the salient stimuli on time perception. Previous 
research has provided support for either of the two conflicting approaches proposed 
by Lavie (2005) and Dillen and Koole (2009). Lavie proposed a model where effects 
of distractors increases when we are deprived of cognitive resources to suppress 
them. In other words, increased working memory load should result in increased 
interference of salient stimuli on time perception. On the other hand, Dillen and Koole 
proposed that the impact of emotional stimuli is not an automatic process and requires 
availability of working memory resources. In other words, restricting working memory 
related resources should result in reduced salient stimuli interference.  
 Our findings provide further support for the Dillen and Koole approach. Both 
p(long) and BP values indicated that salient interference on time perception was 
observed in low difficulty but not in high difficulty. Therefore, the availability of working 
memory resources is crucial for the manifestation of such effects. This also seems to 
support the conceptual Elaborated Intrusion Theory (EI, Kavanagh et al., 2005). 
Kavanagh proposed that in the presence of external cues, automatic processes initiate 
an activation of desire thoughts. These desire thoughts, relying on attentional and 
working memory mechanisms, activate addiction related thoughts and engage further 
with the external cues. The outcome of this process is a perpetual cycle where external 
cues activate desire thoughts and desire thoughts reinforce the impact of external 
cues. This experiment is the first to propose that when working memory resources are 
not available in the first instance the initial desire thought activation process does not 
escalate to a perpetual cycle. This can potentially have great implications on 
prevention of relapse in addiction. A preoccupied and engaged with other activities 
mind might be as crucial (or even more) as abstaining is.  
 Further support to the above argument as well as to the EI theory itself comes 
from our WR analysis. Participants overall demonstrated better discriminability when 





an activation of desire thoughts that in turn increased arousal. We have proposed in 
the past that lower WR values should be associated with increased arousal (Gonidis 
& Sharma, 2017). However, when the difficulty of the task increased the WR values 
also increased resulting in worse discriminability. This indicates, as above, that 
reduced availability of working memory resources prevented external cues from 
putting the perpetual cycle in motion.  
  
Experiment 10 Sternberg: Introduction 
 With the previous experiment we attempted to provide supporting evidence for 
either of the conflicting approaches proposed by Lavie (2005) and Dillen and Koole 
(2009). The former proposed that reduced cognitive resources would enhance 
distractors effects as we lack the means to suppress their impact on our attention. 
The latter proposed that distractors need available cognitive resources in order to 
initiate a cycle of intrusive thoughts. Our results clearly supported the findings of 
Dillen and Koole (2009). However, since Experiment 9 was the first such experiment, 
to the best knowledge of the authors, that included memory load manipulation on an 
addiction modified temporal bisection task, it is vital that we replicate these findings. 
 In Experiment 10, we employed the same temporal task and we manipulated 
the memory load utilising a Sternberg memory task that included a low and a high 
memory load block. In the low memory load (low difficult) participants had to 
memorise four consonants and in the high memory load (low difficult) eight 
consonants. We hypothesised, in line with previous research, that there would be an 
overall greater underestimation of temporal perception in high load compared to low 
load. Furthermore, based on the findings from Experiment 9, we hypothesised that 
as memory load increased the effects of salient stimuli on time perception would 
diminish. As such, we expected that in the low memory load participants would 
underestimate durations for salient stimuli compared to neutral ones and this 






Experiment 10 Sternberg: Method 
Participants 
 In total, 88 participants were recruited for this experiment (12 males and 76 
females) via the RPS website. All participants were students at the University of Kent 
aged between 18 and 48 (M = 20.36, SD = 5.20). Participants were required to have 
an active Facebook account in order to be allowed to complete the experiment. 
Design 
 This was a mixed-design experiment with Image (Facebook, Internet), 
Salience (Salient, Neutral), Duration (400, 600, 800, 1000, 1200, 1400, 1600ms), 
Difficulty (Low, High) being within-subjects factors and Order (Low First: 1, High 
First: 2) being a between-subjects factor. Participants had to report the duration of 
presented events as either long or short. These responses were used to calculate 
the dependent variable of p(long) as the proportion of long responses over the total 
number of trials. The p(long) responses were further used to obtain the Bisection 
Point (BP) and the Weber’s Ratio (WR) psychometrics. Furthermore, for the 
Sternberg task participants had to report whether the presented letter was included 
in the learnt sequence of letters. These responses were used to calculate the ratio of 
correct responses over total number of trials. 
 
Materials 
 This experiment employed a dual task similar to Experiment 9. However, 
instead of the n-back task the Sternberg task was used together with the TB task. 
The two difficulties of the Sternberg task involved participants having to memorise a 
sequence of either four (Low) or eight consonants (High). Participants were 
instructed that they had up to two seconds to respond and they should try to do so 
as fast and as accurate as they can. Furthermore, Young’s YIAT was used as in 






Figure 18 Snapshot of the Sternberg and TB dual task.  
Procedure 
 After being briefed and providing consent, each participant completed the 
experiment in individual cubicles. The experiment was comprised of two separate 
phases of the dual task with low difficulty (four letters) and high difficulty (eight 
letters). Participants would first complete the low difficulty or high difficulty depending 
on the level of Order that they were randomly assigned at. Each phase included a 
training block for the relevant difficulty and then training blocks for the TB task. The 
training block for the Sternberg task comprised of 12 trials with 4 learnt and 8 non-
learnt characters. Participants would also get feedback on whether their response 
was correct or not. Upon completing one phase, participants would then proceed to 
complete the other difficulty phase. Finally, all participants would complete Young’s 
YIAT. They would then be thanked for their participation and reminded them of their 
rights as participants.  
 
Experiment 10: Results 
Data Preparation  
 For each participant the mean correct responses were calculated for the low 
and high difficulty. Furthermore, for the TB trials the p(long) was calculated per 
Image, Salience, and Duration. The BP and WR scores were calculated per Image 
and Salience. Any participant with Sternberg performance below 60% and BP 
outside the 400 and 1600ms was excluded from the analysis. This resulted in 






 The mean correct responses were entered into a two-way ANOVA with 
Difficulty (low, high) and Order (Low First: 1, High First: 2). There was a main effect 
of Difficulty, F(1, 82) = 240.03, p < .001, η2p = .745. This indicated that performance 
was significantly worse for the High Difficulty (MHigh = .79, SDHigh= .046) compared to 
the Low Difficulty (MLow = .97, SDLow= .10). This was expected and is in line with 
previous research and supports further the findings in Exp 9. There was no main 
effect of Order, F(1, 82) = 1.21, p = .274, η2p = .015. Indicating there was no overall 
difference in participants’ Sternberg performance depending on which task they 
performed first (M1 = .88, SD1 = .08, M2 = .87, SD2 = .08.  
 The interaction of Difficulty by Order was also significant, F(1, 65) = 5.342, p = 
.023, η2p = .061. Further post-hoc analysis revealed significant simple main effects of 
Difficulty for the Low First Order (p < .001, MLow = .97, SDLow = .06, MHigh = .81, 
SDHigh = .15) and for High First Order (p < .001, MLow = .98, SDLow = .05, MHigh = .77, 
SDHigh = .14).  
P(long) Analysis   
 The p(long) values were entered into a 5-way ANOVA with Difficulty, Image, 
Salience, Duration as within-subjects factors, and Order as between-subjects factor. 
There was a main effect of Difficulty, F(1, 65) = 6.70, p = .012, η2p = .093, with 
observed power (1-β) = 0.72 (α = .05). This indicated that participants overestimated 
time in the low difficulty (MLow = .553, SDLow= .06) compared to the high difficulty 
(MHigh = .531, SDHigh= .07). This again supports the notion that increasing the 
cognitive resources that available to time keeping can lead to overestimating 
temporal durations.  
 There was also a main effect of Duration, F(6, 390) = 827.07, p < .001, η2p = 
.927, with observed power (1-β) = 1.00 (α = .05) (respective means for 400 to 
1600ms: .047, .096, .336, .646, .818, .907, and .945). This, similarly to Experiment 9, 
was expected and was in line with all previous experiments and research employing 
TB. All other main effects were non-significant (all F’s < 3.4, p’s > .07) 
 There was a significant interaction of Difficulty by Image, F(1, 65) = 5.04, p = 





analysis revealed significant differences between low and high difficulty only for the 
Facebook images and not for the Internet images, p = .002.   
 There was also a significant interaction of Difficulty by Salience, F(1, 65) = 
4.65, p = .035, η2p = .067, with observed power (1-β) = 0.57 (α = .05). Following up 
post-hoc analysis revealed significant differences between Salient and Neutral 
images in low difficulty (respective means: MSal = .545, SDSal = .013; MNeu = .562, 
SDNeu= .014, p = .023) but not in the high difficulty (respective means: MSal = .533, 
SDSal = .014; MNeu = .529, SDNeu= .016, p = .676). This was in line with the prediction 
that increasing difficulty would result in eliminating salience effects and replicated the 
Experiment 9 findings. 
 Finally, there was a significant Difficulty by Duration by Order interaction, F(6, 
390) = 3.86, p < .001, η2p = .089. This also included a Difficulty by Duration interaction, 
p =.001. Post-hoc analysis indicated that there were durations that varied significantly 
depending on the Order that the Sternberg difficulty was presented.  
BP Analysis 
 The BP values were entered into a four-way Anova with Difficulty, Image, 
Salience, and Order as factors. There was a significant main effect of Difficulty, F(1, 
65) = 7.05, p = .01, η2p = .098, with observed power (1-β) = 0.74 (α = .05). This 
indicated that participants had lower BP value, hence overestimated time, for the low 
difficulty (Mlow = 925.95, SDlow= 158.02) compared to the high difficulty (Mhigh = 
962.37, SDhigh= 181.95). This finding is in line with the plong analysis and provides 
further evidence that increased difficulty leads to underestimation of time.  
 There was a also a significant Difficulty by Order interaction, F(1, 65) = 16.71, 
p < .001, η2p = .204, with observed power (1-β) = 0.98 (α = .05). Follow up post-hoc 
analysis revealed a simple main effect of Difficulty only when high difficulty was 
presented first (p < .001; respective means: Mlow= 959.54, SDlow = 231.66; Mhigh = 
939.90, SDhigh= 266.30) and not when low difficulty was presented first (p = .332; 
respective means: Mlow= 892.37, SDlow = 214.97; Mhigh = 984.84, SDhigh= 247.12). 
This seems to indicate that presenting low difficulty first gives enough practice to 
participants and reduces how challenging the find the following task. On the other 
hand, presenting the high difficulty first results in increased difficulty. 





= .025, η2p = .075, with observed power (1-β) = 0.62 (α = .05), with post-hoc analysis 
revealing significant differences between the two images only for high difficulty, p = 
.017. Finally, there was a significant Difficulty by Salience interaction, F(1, 65) = 
5.24, p = .025, η2p = .075, with observed power (1-β) = 0.62 (α = .05), with post-hoc 
analysis revealing significant differences between Salient and Neutral stimuli for low 
difficulty (p = .034) but not for high difficulty (p = .393). This again provides support 
that increased difficulty eliminates any salience interference in the temporal bisection 
task. All other main effects and interactions were non-significant (all p’s > .05). In 
addition, four separate paired samples t-tests were carried out in order to acquire a 
more detailed view on the differences between types of images and salience per 
difficulty. We discovered that salient Facebook images differed from the neutral 
Facebook images only for the low difficulty, t(66) = 2.646, p = .01, d = 0.32, 95% 
CI[10.88, 77.80], indicating a small effect size. The three remaining t-tests were non-
significant, all p’s > .217. 
WR Analysis 
 The WR values were entered into a four-way Anova with Difficulty, Image, 
Salience, and Order as factors. There was a significant Difficulty by Group 
interaction, F(1, 65) = 8.07, p = .006, η2p = .110, with observed power (1-β) = 0.80 (α 
= .05). Post-hoc analysis indicated a significant simple main effect of Difficulty only 
when low difficulty was presented first, (p = .006; respective means: Mlow= .154, 
SDlow = .020; Mhigh = .205, SDhigh= .014). This is supportive of previous finding that 
the order of presentation affects the perceived difficulty and when difficulty is lower, 
differences are observed. There were no other significant main effects nor 
interactions (all p’s > .1).  
YIAT Scores and Correlational Analysis 
 The YIAT scores varied from 0 to 70 (MYIAT = 26.63, SDYIAT =13.72). Forty-
four participants had scores between 0 and 30, 18 had scores between 31 and 49, 
and five had scores between 50 and 79. There were no participants with scores 
higher than 80 that would indicate significant problems due to use of Internet (Young, 
1998).  Furthermore, we ran correlational analysis between the YIAT scores and the 





difficulty. All correlations were non-significant (r’s < .107, p’s > .146). 
 
Experiment 10: Discussion 
 The main aim of this experiment was to replicate the findings of Experiment 9. 
Specifically, to provide more evidence on the effects of increased memory load on the 
temporal distortion caused by salient stimuli. Our findings were similar to the ones in 
Experiment 9 and provided further support for the Dillen and Koole findings (2009. 
Both p(long) and BP values indicated that salient interference on time perception was 
observed in low difficulty but not in high difficulty. Therefore, the availability of working 
memory resources is crucial for the manifestation of such effects. This also seems to 
support the conceptual Elaborated Intrusion Theory (EI, Kavanagh et al., 2005). 
Kavanagh proposed that in the presence of external cues, automatic processes initiate 
an activation of desire thoughts. These desire thoughts, relying on attentional and 
working memory mechanisms, activate addiction related thoughts and engage further 
with the external cues. The outcome of this process is a perpetual cycle where external 
cues activate desire thoughts and desire thoughts reinforce the impact of external 
cues. This experiment provided more evidence that when working memory resources 
are not available in the first instance the initial desire thought activation process does 
not escalate to a perpetual cycle.   
 Furthermore, consistent with previous research and Experiment 9, we found 
that increasing working memory load results in overall underestimation of durations 
(both in terms of BP and p(long)). This provides further support to the attentional 
allocation model that attention is a multi-dimension system that shares a pool of 
resources with other cognitive functions (e.g., Block & Zakay, 1997; Dan Zakay & 
Block, 1996, 2004).  
  Even though we mostly replicated the findings of Experiment 9 it is also vital to 
highlight that the two experiments besides similarities they also differed in terms of 
WR results. Indeed, in Experiment 10 we did not observe differences in the WR of 
salient stimuli across difficulties. A possible explanation of this could be that the 
Sternberg task is not as difficult as the N-back task. Therefore, even though the high 
difficulty in Experiment 10 was difficult enough to lead to BP changes perhaps it was 





use a more difficult version of the Sternberg (e.g, 4 digits vs 8 vs 12) task or even use 
both N-back and Sternberg task in the same experiment in order to shed more light on 
the similarities and difficulties of the two tasks. 
 
 Chapter Conclusion 
In conclusion, the two experiments in this chapter successfully replicated previous 
research and at the same time added novel evidence. We have successfully 
replicated our previous findings that Internet and Facebook related stimuli could lead 
to distorted time perception and better discriminability of temporal durations.  
Furthermore, we provided more evidence that increasing working memory load 
results in overall underestimation of durations which supports the attentional 
allocation model that attention is a multi-dimension system that shares a pool of 
resources with other cognitive functions. Finally, we provided novel evidence that  
in a temporal bisection task, salient stimuli interference relies on the availability of 





 THESIS GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Overview Across Chapters 
 The aim of this thesis was to investigate the potential effects of addiction 
related stimuli on our time perception. Specifically, since addiction models (e.g., EI) 
and ICM both account for attentional, arousal, and memory load effects we explored 
how these three factors can independently, or in conjunction, affect out time 
perception. In the chapter, I will provide a general overview of addiction theories that 
could account for the discovered attentional biases. I will also discuss SET and ICM 
outlining the roles of attentional switch and arousal. Furthermore, I will provide the 
rationale behind this investigation and highlight the novelty of my findings and the 
novel contribution they make to addiction models and ICM. 
 In chapter 2, I aimed to replicate previously established attentional biases in 
Poker players towards gambling related stimuli using a modified Stroop paradigm 
(Experiment 1). This was done in order to establish a point of reference for AB that I 
could later on build upon to explore for AB in time perception in the form of distorted 
temporal perceptions and discriminability. Then I aimed to expand these findings in 
to Facebook/Internet related stimuli in a general student population (Experiment 2). 
Even though, for the latter, the participants were not problematic Facebook/Internet 
users attentional bias towards salient stimuli was still discovered.  
 Focusing on Experiment 1, I observed two interesting findings. First, Poker 
players were overall faster in reporting the colours of all stimuli compared to the 
control group participants. This finding provides further support to the claim that 
salient stimuli can activate a dopaminergic cycle and therefore increase arousal that 
in turn could facilitate overall quicker responses (Franken, 2003; Robinson & 
Berridge, 1993). Second, the Poker players were slower in reporting the colour of 
gambling related stimuli compared to neutral stimuli. This supports the predictions 
made by Tiffany (1990) that addiction is guided by automatic processes and by EI 
that external cues can activate desire thoughts (Kavanagh et al., 2005). The desire 
thoughts conflicted with the task in hand and therefore slowed down responding the 
colour of the stimuli. This effect was further reinforced when two gambling related 
stimuli were presented in succession and when Poker players stared at a gambling 





explained by EI as a result of maintaining the subjective state of desire for longer 
therefore, increasing the effect of associated intrusive thoughts. 
 In Experiment 2, Facebook users completed a novel Facebook/Internet 
modified Stroop and the AB effects were similar to Experiment 1. Participants were 
slower in responding the colour of salient stimuli compared to neutral stimuli. This 
was a novel finding that relevant literature had not explored yet. As discussed above, 
this AB is in line with both Tiffany’s work and EI. Furthermore, slow Stroop effect also 
indicated that this AB increases when two salient stimuli are presented in 
succession. Overall, Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 highlighted similarities in AB 
between Poker players and Facebook users indicating that just frequent Facebook 
use can trigger AB. The results from Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 provided the 
foundations that gambling and Facebook/Internet related stimuli could elicit AB. 
 In chapter 3, using a novel experimental paradigm, I wanted to further explore 
these AB effects but also look at discriminating between attentional arousal effects. 
In Experiment 3, Poker players achieved lower WR scores compared to the control 
group, demonstrating a better temporal discriminability. Again, this is a novel finding 
associating gamblers with increased temporal discriminability. I proposed that this 
reduction in WR is a result of increased arousal as predicted by incentive-
sensitisation theory (Robinson & Berridge, 1993) and EI (Kavanagh et al., 2005). 
Furthermore, I hypothesised that gambling related AB would also be manifested in 
the form of distorted temporal perception. Indeed, Poker players underestimated 
durations for gambling related stimuli compared to neutral stimuli, whereas the 
control group exhibited no differences. This novel finding has direct implications on 
time keeping when exposed to addiction related stimuli. According to ICM this 
underestimation could be due to mode switch opening due to attentional distraction, 
resulting in lost temporal pulses. The attentional distraction can be explain by EI and 
intrusive thoughts due activated desire. Furthermore, this is also supported by the 
positive correlation between the dBP and the overall GACS and the GACS desire 
subscale. Indicating that an increased difference in BP between salient and neutral 
stimuli was associated with increased desire score. This is one of the central claims 
of EI. External cues activate desire to use and while this subjective state stays 
activated, this desire is constantly increasing.  
 In Experiment 4, I wanted to further explore whether presenting positively or 





distortions. Previous research has indicated that threatening stimuli can affect our 
time perception (e.g., Droit-Volet & Meck, 2007;; Tipples, 2008). I operationalised the 
concept of threat by presenting poker hands that would most probably lead to loss, 
contrary poker hands that would most probably lead to winning (positive stimuli). 
However, the only observed outcome, similarly to Experiment 3 was that Poker 
players had better temporal discriminability (reduced WR) compared to the control 
group. There were no differences, either due to arousal or attentional effects, 
between the positive, neutral, and negative stimuli.   
 A possible explanation for this would be that Poker players’ attention was 
focused purely on the fact that the stimuli were gambling related and allocated no 
further cognitive resources on examining whether there would be potentially positive 
or negative outcome. This is despite the fact that Poker players were very good at 
estimating their winning and losing chances. Similar findings were reported by Atkins 
and Sharpe (in: Williams, Connolly, Wood, Currie, & Davis, 2004) were they 
observed no differences no differences in responding the colour between positive 
and negative words in a modified Stroop task. However, no manipulation was done 
in the past which involved positive and negative gambling stimuli. The novel findings 
from Experiment 4 suggest that gamblers ignore the negative of positive aspects and 
they focus purely on whether the content is gambling related or not. A possible 
explanation for this could be that gamblers could implicitly overestimate how lucky 
they can be despite explicitly knowing the actual chances of winning therefore, 
nullifying any potential negative thoughts associated with potential loss.  
 Similarly, to chapter 3, in chapter 4 I wanted to investigate for potential 
temporal perception distortions due to Facebook/Internet related stimuli. Therefore, I 
adopted a novel Facebook/Internet modified temporal bisection task. Furthermore, I 
wanted to see whether repetition would have additional effects. Thus, I included five 
blocks of the modified Temporal Bisection task. The findings from Experiment 5 
expand on the ones from Experiment 3, from the gambling addiction to 
Facebook/Internet addiction related stimuli. Participants demonstrated an overall 
better discriminability for salient stimuli compared to neutral ones, consistent to the 
arousal effects as discussed above. Furthermore, there was a tendency to 
underestimate durations for Facebook related stimuli, indicating perhaps that 
Facebook related stimuli have greater emotional content than the Internet ones. This 





related stimuli even more confident. Furthermore, Experiment 2 and Experiment 5 
were the first to provide experimental evidence that substance addiction theories 
such as Tiffany’s (1990), incentive-sensitisation theory (Robinson & Berridge, 1993) 
and EI (Kavanagh et al., 2005) can be expanded to incorporate forms of Online 
addictions such as Social Media and Internet use. 
 Finally, regarding repetition, results indicated that the first two Blocks were 
significantly different to Blocks 3, 4, and 5. Participants tended to overestimate time 
from one block to the next but that overestimation reached a floor effect at Block 3 
and after that BP slightly reduced in a non-significant manner. This pattern was also 
supported by the WR analysis where participants’ discriminability deteriorated from 
Block 1 to 5. The results from Experiment 5 are in line with Experiment 4 and provide 
further support for the previously discussed addiction theories.  
 In Experiment 6, I wanted to replicate the fatigue results but also explore how 
priming could have an impact the effect of salient stimuli. Therefore, I employed the 
same task as in Experiment 5 but this time the first one-minute break only involved 
engagement with Facebook or all one-minutes breaks involved engagement with 
Facebook. Concerning fatigue, the exact same pattern was observed as in 
Experiment 5 when it came to BP, the first two Blocks significantly differed from 3,4, 
and 5. More interestingly, WR now significantly kept increasing across the five 
Blocks, indicating a constantly reducing arousal. Regarding salience effects, 
durations for Facebook related stimuli were significantly underestimated compared to 
their neutral ones. Furthermore, durations for Internet related stimuli were 
underestimated compared to their neutral ones. This seemed to provide more 
support to our claim that Facebook and Internet stimuli could be treated differently by 
participants, possibly due to different associations made between Facebook and 
Internet.  
 Wanting to explore this potential difference between Facebook and Internet, in 
Experiment 7 we focused on running a study with only two Blocks and this time 
modify the priming task. Indeed, we had three conditions with participants using 
Facebook, Internet, or read a printed-paper, hoping that the first two task would 
reinforce the AB triggered by the corresponding stimuli. Similarly, with the previous 
two experiments there was an overall difference between Block 1 and 2 in terms of 
BP but WR. Participants overestimated time in Block 2 compared to Block 1. 





displayed better temporal discriminability for salient stimuli compared to neutral 
ones. However, no between groups differences were detected suggesting that AB 
effects were unaffected by the priming tasks. A possible explanation for this could 
that these AB effects had already reached a ceiling effect and could not be enhance 
further. It would be perhaps interesting to replicate this study comparing healthy and 
pathological Facebook/Internet users and investigate for potential difference in this 
ceiling effect. 
 In Experiment 8, I wanted to provide an answer to a potential criticism that 
these AB effects could be due to the salient visual stimuli being familiar to 
participants compared to the neutral ones that were novel. For this reason, I 
replaced the images in the Temporal Bisection task with associated non-words. 
Results indicated that participants underestimated time for salience associated non-
words compared to neutral associated non-words. Furthermore, no differences were 
observed between familiar and unfamiliar neutral non-words. These novel findings, in 
terms of addiction associated non-words in time perception, provided further support 
that our overall findings were due to emotional or addiction related content and not 
due to visual familiarity. This enhances our confidence that the observed AB are due 
to attentional switch triggered by intrusive thoughts as proposed by EI, and/or 
arousal effects due to dopaminergic activation as proposed by incentive-sensitisation 
theory.  
 Finally, in chapter 5 I wanted to explore the impact of memory load in time 
perception in conjunction with intrusive thoughts caused by salient stimuli. In 
Experiment 9, I employed a dual-task combining the Temporal Bisection and the N-
back tasks. Results indicated that as difficulty increased participants underestimated 
time more. Furthermore, low difficulty resulted in better temporal discriminability 
compared to the high difficulty. These two results provide support to the claim that 
limiting temporal resources results in underestimation of time and deteriorates 
performance in time perception tasks (Block & Gruber, 2014; Block et al., 2010a). 
More interestingly, as difficulty increased any AB effects due to salience 
disappeared. Indeed, participants had better discriminability for salient stimuli 
compared to the neutral stimuli, in the low difficulty only. The same was observed in 
the BP where differences between salient Facebook images and neutral ones were 
only observed in the low difficulty task.  





(2009) and reject the claims by Lavie (2005) that with increased memory load we 
should observed increased distractors effects. Indeed, Dillen and Koole (2009) 
observed reduced distractor effects when memory load was increased. However, no 
one has investigated before how memory load could affect how addiction related 
distractors impact ICM. Our findings support the EI theory, since working memory 
allocation is essential for the external cues to activate intrusive thoughts. When 
these limited memory resources are already allocated to memory demanding tasks 
this results to external cues being deprived of the fertile conditions to activate 
intrusive thoughts therefore, preventing any AB effects.   
 Further evidence for this claim came from Experiment 10 where the dual task 
this time involved a combination of Temporal Bisection and Sternberg tasks. Again, 
results indicated that as difficulty increased, participants underestimated time more. 
Furthermore, low difficulty resulted in better temporal discriminability compared to 
the high difficulty. When it came to salience effects, there was a significant difference 
between salient and neutral stimuli only in low difficulty, no such difference was 
observed in high difficulty. This is supportive of the claim that salient external cues 
require memory resources to activate intrusive thoughts that can in turn lead to 
distorted time perception.  
Theoretical Implications 
 This novel investigation highlights a number of implications for the research in 
addiction and time perception. The consistent temporal underestimation effects due 
to salient stimuli provide support to relevant addiction theories that addiction related 
cues could cause AB. Indeed, both EI (Kavanagh et al., 2005) and current concerns  
(Cox & Klinger, 2004) theories highlight such effects. EI proposes that external cues 
can activate intrusive thoughts that can elicit AB. Current concerns imply that when 
we are motivated to use a process is activated in order to notice and act upon 
relevant external cues, this could result in a preferential treatment of addiction 
related stimuli. Furthermore, even if not directly relevant to non-substance addiction, 
Franken (2003) proposed that AB could be the result of a conditioning process that 
attributes salience to addiction related stimuli and therefore make them attractive to 
our attention.  





model (ICM). Indeed, ICM includes a mode switch that opens, when our attention is 
divided, resulting in temporal underestimations. The findings across this thesis 
consistently provided support for the existence of such a mode switch as argued by 
(Dan Zakay & Block, 1996) and highlighted its importance in the novel investigation 
of time perception when exposed to addiction related stimuli.  
 Further to the role of attention, this thesis also provided consistent novel 
evidence that arousal is also a contributing factor of distorted time perception in 
addiction. Incentive-sensitisation theory (Robinson & Berridge, 1993) clearly 
highlights the role of arousal as a result of increased dopamine levels. This 
increased arousal accelerates the pacemaker, which would normally result in 
temporal overestimation if all other factors were eliminated (e.g., no attentional effect 
on mode switch). However, as it was clearly stated above attentional effects also 
occurred. This conflicting combining effect between accelerated pacemaker and 
open mode switch could complicate the time perception investigations. 
 This thesis proposed that we could disentangle this combined effect and 
distinctly investigate for attention and arousal effects by focusing on two separate 
psychometrics, the BP and WR. Where BP should be mainly associated with 
attentional effects and WR mainly associated with arousal effect. We say “mainly”, 
because BP is included in the WR calculation. However, when we have 
underestimation only due to attention this would result in increased BP values and 
unaffected WR values. When we have overestimation, only due to arousal effects, 
we should have a greater sensitivity to time and therefore, lower WR values. In other 
words, this increased arousal produces steeper p(long) curves that are associated 
with lower WR values (J. Wearden, 2016). When we have combined effects of the 
two then we should observe both increased BP values and decreased WR values. 
  A further implication that is more relevant to addiction theories comes from 
our novel from the memory load results. There was a clear indication that as memory 
load increased salience effects disappeared, both in terms of BP and WR. This can 
have implications for the study of addiction, specifically supporting EI theory and 
implying that, intrusive thoughts require memory availability to flourish. This finding 
was replicated across two separate memory load paradigms and a temporal 
bisection task and is directly opposing previous research using a Stroop paradigm 
where distractors effects increased with increased cognitive load (e.g., de Fockert, 





as the Stroop effect is guided by automatic processes, the temporal bisection task 
does not, at least not to the same extent. This is something that future research can 
address, especially looking more at the decision making stage and whether this is 
guided more by automatic processes or not.  
Limitations and Future Research 
 This thesis explored how gambling and Facebook/Internet related stimuli 
could cause AB and affect time perception. However, the participants involved with 
this research were mostly recruited from the general University student population. 
Regarding, gambling recruiting from the University of Kent Poker society allowed us 
to have participants that were gambling frequently, and we could measure this using 
validated questionnaires such as PGSI, and compare them to participants who were 
not gambling. Despite this comparison, the limitation of the sample comprised of 
students who might be gambling recreationally remains. It is therefore vital that the 
present work should also be tested with participants that have been identified as 
pathological gamblers in order to replicate the findings in verified addiction sample.  
 However, regarding the Facebook/Internet experiments such manipulation 
was not possible. At the time of the research, there were no validated measurements 
that could assess severity in the use of Facebook or social media. Furthermore, 
even though it was attempted, it was practically impossible to include a condition of 
participants who never used the Internet or Facebook. As above, this limitation 
should be addressed in future research by trying to recruit participants that have 
been identified as excessive users of the Internet and the social media. 
 A further limitation of the work reported in this thesis has to do with the 
established addiction rehabilitation and relapse prevention approaches and to what 
extent our findings can inform their practice. Current successful practices follow a 
holistic approach that include behavioural therapy that helps addicts, and especially 
gamblers, to modify their attitudes towards gambling and retrain them to process 
gambling related cues with a different state of mind that would allow them to abstain 
from gambling. This means the addict is actively encouraged to process his addiction 
thoughts and to try to create news associations with healthier habits and even 
discover what drives their need to gamble. 





intrusive thoughts from triggering attentional bias effects. One could argue that this 
could be generalised and applied as a separate approach to treatment where 
patients do not actively process their addiction thoughts and reshape their cognitions 
but instead, they keep their mind busy preventing intrusive thoughts from finding 
“space” to grow. Up to a certain extent this already applies as it is common guideline 
to encourage addicts to stay productive in society and be pro-active in maintaining 
social bonds with their families and peers. However, we should be mindful that our 
findings come from researching temporal perception in the range of milliseconds up 
to only a few seconds. Moreover, these are novel findings that have not been tested 
thoroughly with special populations and in treatment settings. It is therefore possible 
that they may not extend to different types of addiction or may not be plausible to be 
used in treatment settings.  
   
Conclusion 
 The main aim of this thesis was to examine the effects of addiction related 
stimuli on time perception. For this purpose, two modified temporal bisection tasks 
were used; a gambling and a Facebook/Internet one (Experiment 3 and Experiment 
5). Findings suggested that gambling related stimuli can affect the time perception of 
Poker players and Facebook/Internet related stimuli can affect the time perception of 
Facebook users. One interesting aspect of these findings was that they manifested 
in non-pathological users. Furthermore, this thesis provided evidence that said 
distorted time perceptions were due to the addiction related content of the stimuli 
and not to other visual confounds (Experiment 8). Moreover, increasing the memory 
seemed to counteract the mechanisms that provide fertile ground for intrusive 
thoughts to develop into attentional bias (Experiment 9 and Experiment 10). This 
thesis makes the novel suggestion that time perception can be used in the 
investigation of addiction and can provide insights into addiction theories and 
automatic processes that drive addiction craving and need to use. Therefore, it is 
crucial that future research will employ temporal perception tasks across a spectrum 
of addictive behaviours in order to further explore the roles of arousal, attention, and 
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APPENDIX I: COLLECTION OF NON-WORDS USED IN 
EXP8 
 
Word Length Ortho_N 
athuct 6 0 
athuct 6 0 
clowzy 6 0 
dratty 6 0 
essigy 6 0 
fluash 6 0 
glours 6 0 
houger 6 0 
kleedy 6 0 
laared 6 0 
marpan 6 0 
oppult 6 0 
parung 6 0 
rejele 6 0 
schays 6 0 
threme 6 0 
unlund 6 0 
vespol 6 0 
worghs 6 0 
yeots 5 0 
 
Source: English Lexicon Project Web Site 
http://elexicon.wustl.edu/NonWordStart.asp 
